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PERSONNEL SUPPORTABILITY ASSESSMENT HEAVY DIVISION 86

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TRANSITION VOLUME I(U) ARMY SOLDIER SUPPORT


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
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


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
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Heavy Division 86 Transition. Volume I

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PERSONNEL SUPPORTABILITY ASSESSMENT

AD A128777



HEAVY DIVISION 86 TRANSITION

VOLUME I

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PERSONNEL SUPPORTABILITY ASSESSMENT
HEAVY DIVISION 86 TRANSITION

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INTRODUCTION

The value of the document you are about to use is based on its relationship to your needs and the needs of our Army in the near term (operational), mid term (policy and programs) and long term (strategic) future. The Supportability Assessment is a major tool to portray current and projected personnel requirements to support force manning objectives. It draws on our Functional Review Process, to ensure continuity of effort in "mapping" future requirements toward a single objective: Soldier Effectiveness on the Battlefield. This is a dynamic process. While this document is based on data and transition guidance from end FY81, numerous changes are taking place which will require updating and review of this assessment. Accordingly, VOL V (J-SERIES COMPARISON) will be published in March 1982 based on DA approved J-Series TOE, TAA 88 (ALO by UIC) and MACOM recommended E-Date conversions as approved by revised DA Transition Guidance.

Thus, whether an operator, a policy maker, a program manager, concept developer, training manager or unit leader, our "bridge to the future" is designed to support you in identifying requirements early enough to make a difference to the soldiers upon which our success ultimately depends. An expanding role in providing accurate personnel projections data to support force modernization, proponentcy, mission area analysis, high technology initiatives and evolving manning personnel and training systems, requires increased capabilities. We ensure that our Army can man the force to meet tomorrow's requirements in ways that foster unit cohesion and loyalty to institution and unit, individual responsibility and selfless service to an Army that works. Through our ability to provide projective data to decision makers, we can assist you in your efforts to provide properly recruited and trained soldiers where they are needed now and in the future.

• BACKGROUND

Our initial Heavy Division 86 Personnel Supportability Assessment was published on 12 March 1981. That report was based on a comparison of the current 10 Heavy Divisions (H-Series MTOE) with a model projection of the future 10 Heavy Divisions (Y-Series Automated Unit Reference Sheet (AURS)). The objective was to identify the most significant grade and skill increases resulting from transition to new Heavy Division 86 structures with modernized equipment under existing transition guidance as of January 1981.

RATIONALE

As a result of that assessment, and evolving force structure and transition guidance, Headquarters TRADOC subsequently directed that an assessment of the Heavy Division 86 interim organizations (A-Series AURS) be based upon a requirements comparison within the current Heavy Divisions over time. From a personnel perspective, it is also important to evaluate requirements changes in terms of current personnel assets, or operating strength. Accordingly, a methodology was developed to incorporate both perspectives; fully realizing that operating strength deviations, particularly at lower grades, may be correctable in the near term.

• AFFORDABILITY Planning for the transition to Army 86 organizations has included consideration of force structuring affordability. This requires investigation of the manpower impacts which are usually articulated in terms of "spaces".

MANNING OBJECTIVE


Manning objectives are AURS or TOE requirements for spaces where requirements and authorizations for actual unit manning are assumed to be equal. While efforts are being made to standardize MTOE documents between like units, authorizations may vary between like unit manning levels due to priorities, resource constraints and other factors.

SUPPORT- ABILITY

(A supportability analysis specifically focuses on personnel resources and training impacts. This may be characterized as "faces"-grade and skill constraints coupled with training base capabilities which may be within overall manpower ceilings. Detailed MOS data is contained in VOL I, Annex B (MOS MATRIX) and VOL III (PROJECTIONS DATA). Such an assessment is absolutely essential to ensure that our Army can recruit, train and retain soldiers with the right skills to meet the demands of our future organizations, doctrine, equipment, logistics support and deployment requirements.


Officer Master Files. Authorizations obtained from the PERSACS-AUDS and requirements from the TRADOC A-Series AURS T Column and ALO 2 column for the units in the 10 Heavy Divisions. These were compared with the Y and J Series AURS for document comparison. ODCSOPS DA approved transition guidance, conversion schedules, fielding plans and equipment distribution plans were used to define assumptions. The methodology is defined in detail in VOL I, Annex A (METHODOLOGY). Force Structure detail assumptions are as shown in VOL IV (S) (ASSUMPTIONS AND CONVERSION SCHEDULE). The methodology is portrayed below:

METHODOLOGY SCHEMATIC



SPACE INCREASES


The total increase in spaces from the current force (H-Series MTOE) to the transition or interim Heavy Division 86 force (A-Series AURS - Transition) structure is 11,850 spaces or 7%. The increase from the current force to the Heavy Division 86 force (A-Series AURS at ALO 2) structure is 19,816 spaces, or 12%. A comparison is shown below:



OFFICER INCREASES

The increase in officer spaces from the current MTOE force to the transition force (A-Series, T Column) is 2,423 spaces or 24%. Current force to Heavy Division 86 force (A-Series, ALO 2) officer spaces increase by 2,868 spaces, or 29%. These increases must be accommodated within a current operating strength shortfall of 488 officers in the 10 Heavy Divisions. Officer space changes are shown below:


OFFICER MANNING OBJECTIVES
(Scaled in Thousands)



WARRANT OFFICER INCREASES


The increase from the current warrant officer MOTE force to the transition force (A-Series, T Column) is 665 spaces, or 28%. These increases must be accommodated within a current operating strength shortfall of 354 warrant officers in the 10 Heavy Divisions. Current MTOE force to Heavy Division 86 force (A-Series, ALO 2) warrant officer requirements increase by 1,004 spaces or 42%. Warrant officer space changes are shown below:

WARRANT OFFICER MANNING OBJECTIVES
(Scaled in Thousands)



ENLISTED INCREASES

The increase of enlisted spaces from the current MTOE force to the transition (A-Series, T Column) force is 8,762 or 6%. Current force to Heavy Division 86 force (A-Series, ALO 2) enlisted spaces increased by 15,944, or 11%. While current enlisted operating strength in the 10 Heavy Divisions exceeds current authorizations by 1204, a decrease in enlisted authorizations by 1063 between FY81 and FY82, and 644 between FY81 and FY83 increases the burden on the personnel and training system to field an increase of 7,386 in FY84. Enlisted space changes are shown below:



BY GRADE CHANGES

Detailed by-grade impacts of Heavy Division 86 transition are contained in VOL I, Section 3 (MANNING OBJECTIVES).

POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS

A number of potential problem areas were surfaced as a result of this analysis. Six officer SSI, four warrant officer MOS, and 32 enlisted MOS were identified as requiring further attention either by personnel policy and program managers, by personnel operations managers or by the training community. These are identified in VOL I, Section 5 (POTENTIAL PROBLEMS).

PERSONNEL IMPACTS

In addition to space increases, there is a significant personnel impact resulting from the high number of new and no longer needed grade and speciality requirements associated with Heavy Division 86 transition. This will result in substantial internal turbulence. Grade and skill substitutability, tradeoffs and training considerations, therefore, become primary considerations.

If new authorizations are not consistent with skills and grades in the current personnel inventory, reclassification and grade substitution become necessary and may soon create retention problems. Further, many new or increased MOS and grades represent entry into the force structure where no current assets exist; however, there is currently no lateral entry program for soldiers. Thus, increased numbers of soldiers with new skills must be "grown" from existing assets to produce senior specialists and non commissioned officers. This must be done in the potentially turbulent context of evolving systems such as unit replacement, the American Regimental System, Mastery Training, potential changes for the role of women in the divisional force and the as yet unknown personnel and training requirements for systems still in development. These are discussed in detail in VOL I, ANNEX D (SYSTEM RELATIONSHIPS).

CONCLUSIONS/
RECOMENDA-
TIONS

Detailed conclusions resulting from in-depth analysis of data relevant to this assessment are contained in VOL I, Section 6 (CONCLUSIONS). These indicate that, despite a less costly force structure end state than originally articulated in the Y-Series AURS, the transition to Heavy Division 86 using the A Series AURS possesses serious supportability challenges to the Army personnel and training community. Recommendations, contained in VOL I, Section 7 (RECOMMENDATIONS), are designed to focus attention on problem areas, interface with evolving systems and identify supportability issues requiring resolution. They provide a vehicle by which appropriate decision makers can investigate, coordinate or take action to resolve the immediate and long-term impacts in their areas of concern.

STRUCTURE

STRUCTURE CHANGES

Space comparisons were based upon current approved H-Series Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs). Standard Requirements Codes (SRC) for the major subordinate elements of the doctrinal Mechanized and Armor Divisions are identified at Incl 1. Information was derived using data provided 29 July 1981 update TOE TAPE, Jul 81 PERSACS, Enlisted Master File (EMF) and the Officer Master File (OMF).

ACTUAL VS DOCTRINAL REQUIREMENTS

The SRCs of the Divisional major subordinate elements were used to identify actual authorizations as opposed to using Division SRCs to identify overall doctrinal requirements. Use of the Division doctrinal requirement is appropriate for one-to-one design comparisons, but it does not facilitate a present-to-objective force comparison of more than one Division.

DIVISION MIX

Use of component SRCs accurately reflects present status. The actual mix of each Division's major subordinate elements is used. None of the ten Heavy Divisions consists of all the standard components represented in the Doctrinal Division. The ten Divisions are structured as shown at Incl 2. Three Divisions have only two Brigades. Two Divisions have one very large, non-standard, forward deployed, Brigade Headquarters company. The number of tank Battalions ranges from 3 to 7. One Division has no NBC company. Two Divisions have no CEWI Battalion. Two Engineer Battalion SRCs are used.

LEVELS OF ORGANIZATION (ALO)


Use of component SRCs accurately reflects actual authorizations, by identifying the actual level of organization designated for each Division's major subordinate element. One of the force design assumptions is that the Division 86 organizational structures will be primarily manned at level 2. Different levels of organization are designated for each of the 10 Divisions and for each of their major subordinate elements. However, most are generally at Level 2. From a personnel perspective, use of component SRCs to identify actual authorizations as opposed to using Division SRCs to identify overall doctrinal requirements is essential. Use of component SRCs more accurately reflects fiscal year projections. The Division 86 transition plan conversions are by type unit, not by Division. SRCs of Divisional major subordinate elements should,

therefore, be used in order to identify the most definitive manning changes. But the difference between those two perspectives is significant, as reflected below:

REQUIREMENTS COMPARISON

ACTUAL VS DOCTRINAL REQUIREMENTS

- DOCTRINAL H-SERIES, LEVEL 1 189954
 - 6 X 19071 = 114426
 - 4 X 18882 = 75528
- DOCTRINAL, LEVEL 2 177516
- ACTUAL COMPONENT TOE, LEVEL 1 191724
- ACTUAL COMPONENT MTOE AUTHORIZATIONS 163747



UNIT STRUCTURE CROSS REFERENCES

A TOE comparison of current (H-Series) and Interim (A-Series) organizational structures is at Incl 1. Incl 1 also identifies SRCs of the standard major subordinate elements of the Doctrinal Armor and Mechanized Divisions. The Heavy Divisions's Troop Lists, identifying Unit Identification Codes (UIC) of major subordinate elements, is at Incl 2. Incl 3 identifies organizational structures.

ORGANIZATION DIAGRAMS

This assessment includes descriptions of the differences between all components of the current and Objective Divisions, with 73 updated organizational diagrams in VOL I, Annex C. The basic organizational diagrams for the Interim structures are identical to those of the final structures. In the remarks column of the organizational chart, the unit strengths are identified for A-Series AURS and for available J-Series draft TOEs.

INTERIM CONVERSION
STANDARD REQUIREMENTS CODES

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SRC</u>	<u>ALO1</u> OFF/WO/ENL/AGG	<u>ALO2</u> OFF/WO/ENL/AGG	<u>TRAN</u> OFF/WO/ENL/AGG
DIV TRPS:				
HHC Armor	87004A110	90/1/109/200	81/1/102/182	81/1/102/184
HHC Mech	87004A120	87/1/111/199	78/1/104/183	78/1/104/183
MP Co	19217A100	7/0/112/119	7/0/103/110	7/0/103/110
SIG Bn	11035A100	25/4/546/575	25/4/497/526	25/4/497/526
ADA Bn	44275A100	50/8/907/965	50/8/836/894	47/8/762/817
(MAB) ENG Bn	05145A110	51/9/914/974	48/8/863/919	44/8/785/837
CEWI Bn	34285A100	44/22/516/582	43/22/463/528	43/22/472/537
NBC Co	03387A100	12/1/160/173	11/1/138/150	10/0/117/127
(RIB) ENG Bn	05145A140	51/9/920/980	48/8/863/919	44/8/785/837
BDE:				
HHC Armor	87042A110	27/0/104/131	25/0/91/116	25/0/95/120
HHC Mech	87042A120	27/0/105/132	25/0/92/117	25/0/96/121
M60 Armor Bn	17235A110	40/2/474/516	40/2/461/503	39/2/445/486
M-1 Armor Bn	17235A120	40/2/511/553	40/2/496/538	38/2/479/519
ML13 MX Bn	07245A120	44/2/910/956	44/2/795/841	44/2/795/841
IFV/CFV MX Bn	07245A110	45/2/852/899	44/2/804/849	44/2/779/825
DIV ARTY:				
HHB	06302A100	36/4/164/204	32/4/157/193	32/4/155/191
TAB	06307A100	6/6/149/161	6/6/145/157	6/6/145/157
8"/MLRS	06395A110	39/3/739/781	38/3/709/750	28/3/438/469
8" (3x4)	06395A130	29/2/509/540	28/2/470/500	28/2/470/500
155(3x8) (Armor)	06365A110	49/3/775/827	48/3/712/763	49/3/601/653
155(3x8) (Mech)	06365A130	49/3/787/839	48/3/723/774	49/3/612/664
155(3x6) (Armor)	06365A150	49/2/706/757	49/2/633/684	49/2/596/647
155(3x6) (Mech)	06365A170	49/2/727/778	49/2/657/708	49/2/622/673
ACAB:				
HHT	17202A100	26/1/91/118	25/1/83/109	23/1/82/106
CSAB	01285A110	38/69/547/654	38/69/510/617	37/69/487/593
AHB	1725A100	18/50/202/270	18/50/199/267	18/50/191/259
Cav Sqdn	17205A100	40/27/566/633	40/27/506/573	40/29/548/617
DISCOM:				
HHC	63002A100	18/3/84/105	17/3/80/100	17/3/80/100
DMMC	63003A100	18/16/136/170	18/15/117/150	18/15/117/150
AG Co	1221A100	16/5/238/259	16/5/212/233	14/5/238/257
FIN Co	14037A610	6/0/85/91	6/0/81/87	6/0/85/91
Maint Bn	43005A100	24/14/679/717	24/13/629/666	24/13/608/645
S&T Bn	42005A100	19/2/459/480	19/2/427/448	16/1/347/364
Med Bn	08205A100	28/1/126/155	28/1/117/146	24/1/109/134
2x1 Bde Spt Bn	63005A110	26/6/432/464	26/6/407/439	26/6/401/433
2x2 Bde Spt Bn	63005A120	26/6/458/490	26/6/433/465	26/6/427/459
1x2 Bde Spt Bn	63005A130	26/6/419/451	26/6/394/426	26/6/388/420

TOE COMPARISON

UNIT	TOE		CURRENT ALO 1		ALO 1 A-SERIES		ALO 2 A-SERIES		TRAN COLUMN A-SERIES	
	ARMOR	MECH	ARMOR	MECH	ARMOR	MECH	ARMOR	MECH	ARMOR	MECH
DIVISION TROOPS										
RHC	17-004H000	37004H000	188	191	200	199	182	183	184	183
MP CO	19017H710	19017H710	207	207	119	119	110	110	110	110
SIG BN	11035H000	11035H000	702	702	575	575	526	526	526	526
ADA BN	44325H000	44325H000	826	826	965	965	894	894	817	817
ENG BN (HAB)	05145H710	05145H710	935	935	974	974	919	919	837	837
CEVT BN	34165H820	34165H810	600	597	582	582	528	528	537	537
NBC CO	03087H700	03087H700	111	111	173	173	150	150	127	127
ENG BN (RIB)	05145H730	05145H730	939	939	980	980	919	919	837	837
BRIGADES										
RHC	17042H000	37042H000	119(3)	119(3)	131(3)	132(3)	116(3)	117(3)	120(3)	121(3)
TANK BN (M-1)	17035H010	17035H010	537(6)	537(5)	516(6)	516(5)	503(6)	503(5)	519(6)	519(5)
TANK BN (M-60)	07045H030	07045H030	815(5)	815(6)	899(6)	899(5)	841(6)	841(5)	841(6)	841(5)
MX BN (113)										
MX BN (1PV)										
DIV ARTY										
RHB	06302H000	06302H000	217	217	204	204	193	193	191	191
TAB	06307H600	06307H600	169	169	161	161	157	157	157	157
8" MLRS										
8" (3X4)	06395H020	06395H020	541	541	540	540	500	500	500	500
155 (3X8)										
155 (3X6)	06365H000	06365H000	592(3)	592(3)	827(3)	839(3)	763(3)	774(3)	653(3)	664(3)
ACAB										
RHT										
CSAB										
AHB										
CAV SQDN	17105H020	17105H020	897	897	633	633	267(2)	267(2)	259(2)	259(2)
CAV AVN BN	17085H700	17085H700	1151	1151	633	633	573	573	617	617
DISCOM										
RHC	29002H700	29002H700	112	112	105	105	100	100	100	100
DPMC	29003H500	29003H500	137	137	170	170	150	150	150	150
AG CO	12017H610	12017H610	286	286	259	259	233	233	257	257
PTN CO	14037H610	14037H610	91	91	91	91	87	87	91	91
MAINT BN	29035H000	29035H000	1311	1311	717	717	666	666	645	645
S AND T BN	29115H000	29115H000	469	469	480	480	448	448	364	364
MED BN	08035H000	08035H000	396	396	155	155	146	146	134	134
2X1 (BS BN)										
2X2 (BS BN)										
1X2 (BS BN)										
1 DIV TOTAL			18776	19054	19862	20233	18676	19011	17467	17889

(AS OF 1 Jan 81)

UNITID	1 CAV	1 AR	2 AR	2 AR (FWD)	3 AR	1 PX	1 PX (FWD)	3 PX	4 PX	4 PX (FWD)	5 PX	8 PX	24 PX
HHC DIV(AUG)	WAG2AA	WAGU99	WAKQAA		WAEKAA	WAG9AA		WAB999	WAZ2AA		WANGAA	WAPBAA	WAKJAA
	WAG3AA	WAKCIA	WAEFAA		WAFCAA	WAI1AA		WAB1AA	WAZ3AA		WABHAA	WAPCAA	WAKLAA
	WAG4AA	WAKJAA	WAPDAA		WAFBAA	WAI2AA		WAB2AA	WAK5AA		WABKAA	WAPFAA	WAKMAA
	WAI1AO	WCGH10	WII110		WAXA10		WD2XT0	WII120	WAXB10		WD21T0	WCH8T0	WEZH10
	WAI2AO	WCGH20	WII120		WAXA20		WD2XA0	WII130	WAXB20		WD21X0	WCH8X0	WEZH20
	WAI3AO	WCGH30	WII130		WAXA30		WD2XB0	WII140	WAXB30		WD21Y0	WCH8Y0	WEZH30
	WAI4AO	WCGH40	WII140		WAXA40		WD2XC0	WII150	WAXB40		WD21Z0	WCH8Z0	WEZH40
	WAI5AO	WCGH50	WII150		WAXA50		WD2XD0	WII160	WAXB50		WD21A0	WCH8A0	WEZH50
	WAI6AO	WCGH60	WII160		WAXA60		WD2XE0	WII170	WAXB60		WD21B0	WCH8B0	WEZH60
	WAI7AO	WCGH70	WII170		WAXA70		WD2XF0	WII180	WAXB70		WD21C0	WCH8C0	WEZH70
HHC DIV(AUG)	WAGQAA	WACBAA	WADZAA	WADZD0	WAEUAA	WAI1AA		WAI1D0	WAZ2AA	WAZ2F0	WABUAA	WAPRAA	WAP7AA
	WDL8AA	WIS1AA			WIG6AA	WII63AA		WIC6AA	WII64AA		WIB8AA	WIC21AA	WII49AA
	WBP6AA		WII7BA		WAB8AA	WAB1AA		WIB7AA	WAB2AA		WIB8AA	WIBV2AA	WIBV4AA
	WABZAA	WAZKAA	WABZAA		WAB9AA	WAB2AA		WAB3AA	WAB4AA		WAB5AA	WAB6AA	WAB7AA
	WAB8AA	WAB9AA	WABZAA		WAB1AA	WAB2AA		WAB3AA	WAB4AA		WAB5AA	WAB6AA	WAB7AA
	WAB9AA	WABZAA	WABZAA		WAB1AA	WAB2AA		WAB3AA	WAB4AA		WAB5AA	WAB6AA	WAB7AA
	WABZAA	WABZAA	WABZAA		WAB1AA	WAB2AA		WAB3AA	WAB4AA		WAB5AA	WAB6AA	WAB7AA
	WABZAA	WABZAA	WABZAA		WAB1AA	WAB2AA		WAB3AA	WAB4AA		WAB5AA	WAB6AA	WAB7AA
	WABZAA	WABZAA	WABZAA		WAB1AA	WAB2AA		WAB3AA	WAB4AA		WAB5AA	WAB6AA	WAB7AA
	WABZAA	WABZAA	WABZAA		WAB1AA	WAB2AA		WAB3AA	WAB4AA		WAB5AA	WAB6AA	WAB7AA
HHC DIV(AUG)	WAGFAA	WAGFAA	WAD9AA	WADT99	WAE1AA	WAI1AA		WAI1D0	WAZ2AA	WAZ2KAA	WABHAA	WAPFAA	WAKQAA
	WAGGAA	WAGFAA	WAD9AA	WADTAA	WAE2AA	WAI2AA		WAI2D0	WAZ3AA	WAZ3KAA	WABHAA	WAPFAA	WAKQAA
	WAGHAA	WAGFAA	WAD9AA	WADTAA	WAE3AA	WAI3AA		WAI3D0	WAZ4AA	WAZ4KAA	WABHAA	WAPFAA	WAKQAA
	WAGIAA	WAGFAA	WAD9AA	WADTAA	WAE4AA	WAI4AA		WAI4D0	WAZ5AA	WAZ5KAA	WABHAA	WAPFAA	WAKQAA
	WAGJAA	WAGFAA	WAD9AA	WADTAA	WAE5AA	WAI5AA		WAI5D0	WAZ6AA	WAZ6KAA	WABHAA	WAPFAA	WAKQAA
	WAGKAA	WAGFAA	WAD9AA	WADTAA	WAE6AA	WAI6AA		WAI6D0	WAZ7AA	WAZ7KAA	WABHAA	WAPFAA	WAKQAA
	WAGLAA	WAGFAA	WAD9AA	WADTAA	WAE7AA	WAI7AA		WAI7D0	WAZ8AA	WAZ8KAA	WABHAA	WAPFAA	WAKQAA
	WAGMAA	WAGFAA	WAD9AA	WADTAA	WAE8AA	WAI8AA		WAI8D0	WAZ9AA	WAZ9KAA	WABHAA	WAPFAA	WAKQAA
	WAGNAA	WAGFAA	WAD9AA	WADTAA	WAE9AA	WAI9AA		WAI9D0	WAZ10AA	WAZ10KAA	WABHAA	WAPFAA	WAKQAA
	WAGOAA	WAGFAA	WAD9AA	WADTAA	WAE10AA	WAI10AA		WAI10D0	WAZ11AA	WAZ11KAA	WABHAA	WAPFAA	WAKQAA
HHC DIV(AUG)	WAGPAA	WAGFAA	WAD9AA	WADTAA	WAE11AA	WAI11AA		WAI11D0	WAZ12AA	WAZ12KAA	WABHAA	WAPFAA	WAKQAA
	WAGQAA	WAGFAA	WAD9AA	WADTAA	WAE12AA	WAI12AA		WAI12D0	WAZ13AA	WAZ13KAA	WABHAA	WAPFAA	WAKQAA
	WAGRAA	WAGFAA	WAD9AA	WADTAA	WAE13AA	WAI13AA		WAI13D0	WAZ14AA	WAZ14KAA	WABHAA	WAPFAA	WAKQAA
	WAGSAA	WAGFAA	WAD9AA	WADTAA	WAE14AA	WAI14AA		WAI14D0	WAZ15AA	WAZ15KAA	WABHAA	WAPFAA	WAKQAA
	WAGTAA	WAGFAA	WAD9AA	WADTAA	WAE15AA	WAI15AA							

MANNING OBJECTIVES

TOTAL MANNING OBJECTIVES


Total manning objectives for the 10 Heavy Divisions increase from a baseline (FY81) heavy division force (MTOE authorizations) of 163,747 to a Heavy Division 86 force (A-Series, ALO 2) of 183,563, an increase of 19,816 spaces or 12%. The current force (FY82) authorizations increase from 162,953 to 183,563, an increase of 20,610 spaces or 13%.

COMPARING OPERATING STRENGTH WITH SPACE REQUIREMENTS

Comparing current operating strength against authorized space, the current operating strength in the 10 Heavy Divisions of 164,109 exceeds FY81 force authorizations by 362 faces and the FY82 force authorizations by 1156 faces. This total, however, masks an Officer shortfall of 488 faces, primarily in grades 03 and 04, for the FY81 force and 607 for the FY82 force; and a Warrant Officer shortfall of 354 faces for the FY81 force and 504 faces for the FY82 force. Enlisted strength exceeds FY81 force authorizations by 1204 faces and FY82 force authorizations by 2267 faces. This excess, however, is in grade E3, which masks a shortfall in overall E4 to E9 operating strength.

OFFICER AND WARRANT OFFICER BY GRADE COMPARISON


Officer and Warrant Officer manning objectives as a percent of change when comparing the FY81 force to the Heavy Division 86 A-Series, ALO 2 (FY91) force are shown below:



ENLISTED BY
GRADE
COMPARISON

Enlisted manning objectives, by grade, as a percentage of change when comparing the FY81 force with the Heavy Division 86 A-Series ALO 2 (FY91) force are shown below:

ENLISTED SPACES
CURRENT MTOE - HV DIV 36 A SERIES ALO 2



NEAR TERM
INCREASES

Analysis of total manning objectives suggests that the 10 Heavy Divisions, manned primarily at ALO 2, increase gradually by 19,816 spaces or a 12% over a 10 year period from FY81 to FY91. Analysis of the Transition force, however, presents a different problem since the increase between FY82 and FY85 is 12,626 spaces, or an 8% increase over a three year period. The majority of this increase occurs in one year, FY84.

ADDITIONAL
MANNING
OBJECTIVES

The impact of changing unit documentation and new, but as yet undocumented, equipment personnel space requirements may significantly affect the manning of the 10 heavy divisions in the outyears. As many as 2210 additional spaces, of which 2050 are associated with the Tank Battalions, have been identified in the J-Series TOE that were not included in the A-Series AURS. New equipment discussed in VOL I, Section 5 (SYSTEM RELATIONSHIPS) may require an additional 1458 spaces to support SOTAS, TEAMPACK, TCAC-D/ASAS, TRAILBLAZER, QUICKFIX, and REMBASS systems associated with the CEWI Battalion. This suggests a potential increase

of 3668 additional spaces for a total of 33,486 or a 14% increase over a 10 year period. Of this total, 2326 spaces are those documented in the J-Series draft TOE but omitted from the A-Series AURS.

SPECIALTY AND GRADE CHANGES

Many specialty and grade spaces to support Heavy Division 86 are not in the current force. 30 new specialties, along with 25 grade changes in existing specialties are needed for support of personnel spaces. These space changes recur frequently, thus causing thousands of individual personnel classification impacts. This does not consider the numerous specialties and grades currently found in the operating strength of the 10 heavy divisions for which no current or future authorizations exist. Many specialty and grade authorization within the current force are not required to support Heavy Division 86 structures. 55 specialties are no longer needed, and 90 grade deletions of specific in the retained specialties, must be addressed to align personnel faces with spaces for the 10 Heavy Divisions. These changing demands will cause thousands of individual personnel classification impacts.


TURBULENCE

The numerous skill and grade changes required for Heavy Division 86 transition reflect a vast improvement from Y-Series documentation in which 133 new specialties, 215 new specific grade requirements within authorized specialties, 33 no longer needed specialties and 59 deletions of specific grade in retained specialties were identified. These impacts, while somewhat lessened by improved documentation, continue to create a high degree of grade and skill turbulence for the heavy division force during the transition period. The matching of spaces and faces to support these changing skills and grades will require close monitoring and intensive, individualized personnel and training management.


PROJECTIONS

TOTAL
MANNING
OBJECTIVES
BY FY


Total Officer manning objectives are shown below:



Total Warrant Officer manning objectives are shown below:



Total Enlisted Manning Objectives are shown below:




Total Heavy Division 86 manning objectives are as follows:

<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>
163747	162953	164541	174107	175597	176308
<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	
179015	180367	182884	183217	183563	

**OFFICER
SPACE
INCREASES**

Functional area officer space increases between FY81 MTOE authorizations and FY91 A-Series ALO 2 requirements are as follows:


**OFFICER SPACE INCREASES
BY FUNCTIONAL AREAS**



WARRANT
OFFICER
SPACE
INCREASES

Functional area warrant officer space increases between FY81 MTOE authorizations and FY91 A-Series ALO 2 requirements are shown below:


WARRANT OFFICER SPACE INCREASES
BY FUNCTIONAL AREAS



ENLISTED
SPACE
INCREASES

Functional area enlisted space increases between FY81 MTOE authorizations and FY91 A-Series ALO 2 requirements are as follows:

ENLISTED SPACE INCREASES
BY FUNCTIONAL AREAS



OFFICERS

GRADE	OPSTR	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY90	FY91	Y-ALD 1
08	0	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
07	28	19	18	21	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
06	63	58	58	78	80	82	87	88	88	88	88	88	68
05	428	439	439	488	554	558	568	575	580	581	582	582	517
04	961	1406	1427	1541	1750	1764	1789	1814	1836	1842	1845	1845	1832
03	3449	3798	3803	4184	4722	4714	4744	4807	4827	4856	4867	4871	4838
02	4568	4255	4349	4944	5228	5260	5250	5334	5344	5417	5430	5437	5540
TOTALS	9497	9985	10104	11266	12364	12408	12468	12648	12705	12814	12842	12853	12825

WARRANT OFFICERS

GRADE	OPSTR	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY90	FY91	Y-ALD 1
WO	2047	2401	2551	2558	2996	3066	2974	3125	3292	3332	3405	3405	3638
TOTALS	2047	2401	2551	2558	2996	3066	2974	3125	3292	3332	3405	3405	3638

ENLISTED

GRADE	OPSTR	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY90	FY91	Y-ALD 1
E9	427	429	431	412	444	448	458	465	470	471	472	472	465
E8	2082	2709	2596	2585	2686	2693	2723	2747	2769	2790	2796	2796	2719
E7	6876	7054	7321	7660	8195	8185	8210	8337	8397	8491	8521	8527	8361
E6	14872	15711	15884	16374	17267	17409	17444	17539	17537	17575	17491	17451	17992
E5	27504	28902	29643	29130	31755	32028	32042	32591	32924	33460	33561	33639	35685
E4	46515	55583	55144	54669	57065	57579	57853	58501	58745	59540	59618	59611	66205
E3	54289	40973	39279	39887	41335	41781	42136	43062	43528	44411	44511	44809	44805
TOTALS	152565	151361	150298	150717	158747	160123	160866	163242	164370	166738	166970	167305	176232

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

IDENTIFICATION OF SUPPORT- ABILITY PROBLEMS

The following criteria were used to identify potential personnel supportability problem areas for MOS/SSI required to support the transition to Heavy Division 86:

MANNING OBJECTIVE

MOS/SSI requirements increase 20% or more between FY81 and FY91.

or

(ALL DATA IS
KEYED TO
REQUIREMENTS
INCREASES
UNLESS NOTED)

MOS/SSI requirements increase 50% or more between FY81 and FY91.

MANNING OBJECTIVE INCREASES

<u>OFFICER</u>		<u>WO</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>				
11B	53A	011A	05B	17B	35K	62J	74F
12A	54A	100E	05D	17H	35R	62N	76J
12B	56A	160A	05G	19K	35U	63B	76V
13B	60A	201A	05H	24W	36M	63E	76W
13D	60C	211B	11M	27B	42E	63G	91Y
13E	60E	224B	12F	27E	45E	63J	92B
14B	61F	271A	13B	27G	45G	63S	93F
15B	61J	287A	13C	27N	45K	63W	96B
15M	62A	290A	13E	27P	45L	63Y	98C
15S	67B	411A	13F	27Q	45T	63Z	98J
21A	67F	621A	13H	27Z	52C	67T	98Z
35A	71A	630A	13R	31E	52D	67Y	
35C	72A	711A	13T	31S	54C	67Z	
36A	73A	741A	15D	31T	54E	68E	
37A	74A	762A	15J	31V	54Z	68H	
42A	81A	971A	16H	32Z	55B	68K	
42B	91A	982A	16L	33S	55X	68M	
42X	92A	983A	16S	34C	57F	71M	
44A	92B	988A	16Z	34Y	62P	71P	

OPERATING STRENGTH LOW

MOS/SSI operating strength less than 90% of FY81 division requirements.

FY81 HEAVY DIVISION OPERATING STRENGTH LESS THAN 90%

<u>OFFICER</u>		<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>			
14A	63A	100B	00Z	13Z	35P	71C
14B	67F	100E	02C	16S	35U	73Z
35A	67H	160A	02D	16Z	41B	74Z
35C	67K	201A	02G	17K	42E	75D
37A	68H	211A	02H	19E	45D	75E
41A	68N	224B	02J	19Z	45E	75Z
46A	68S	271A	02K	26C	45F	76V
53A	70A	285A	02N	27B	45L	84Z
53B	72A	286A	02R	27E	45T	91Q
56A	76A	411A	05G	27Z	52C	91Y
60A	92A	630A	05H	31T	54Z	96C
60C	92B	762A	11B	31V	55X	97B
60E	92X	964A	11C	31Z	55Z	98C
60L	93A	971A	13C	33S	63D	98G
61F	95D	973A	13F	34K	63H	98J
61J		982A	13R	34Y	63S	98Z
61H		983A	13W	34Z	63T	
61N		988A	13Y	35G	67T	

MOS/SSI operating strength less than 90% of FY81 division requirements were manning objectives are increasing.

LOW OPERATING STRENGTH
WITH INCREASING MANNING OBJECTIVES

<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
14B 67F	100E	05G 31V 63S
35A 72A	160A	05H 33S 67T
35C 92A	201A	13C 34Y 76V
37A 92B	224E	13F 35U 91Y
53A	271A	13R 42E 98C
56A	411A	16S 45E 98J
60A	630A	16Z 45L 98Z
60C	762A	27B 45T
60E	982A	27E 52C
61F	983A	27Z 54Z
61J	988A	31T 55X

CRITICAL
SKILL

MOS has been identified by MILPERCEN as a Critical Skill and requirements are increasing.

FY81 CRITICAL SKILLS

MOS
05B
13F
13M
34Y
98C

SIMOS

MOS has been identified by MILPERCEN as a Space Imbalanced MOS (SIMOS) = 55% or more OCONUS and requirements are increasing.

OR

MOS is near-SIMOS (50% or more OCONUS) and requirements are increasing.

FY81
SPACE IMBALANCED MOS (SIMOS)

<u>MOS</u>	<u>SIMOS %</u>	<u>NEAR-SIMOS %</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>SIMOS %</u>	<u>NEAR-SIMOS %</u>
05B		52	31T	60	
05C		53	34Y		50
05D	68		36H		52
05H	59		45G		50
11M	100		45T	88	
13R	75		52C		50
15D	76		55Z	55	
15J	72		63D		52
27B		54	63G		51
27E		50	63S	55	
27G		52	63T	55	
31E		53	63W	58	
31J	56		76C	56	
31S		50	98C	55	
			98G	57	

MALE/FEMALE
RATIO

Females comprise 10% or more of MOS population where MOS is SIMOS or near-SIMOS and requirements are increasing.

FY81 MOS WITH
HIGH FEMALE RATIO

<u>MOS</u>	<u>% FEMALE</u>
05B	12
05C	12
05D	28
05H	24
31J	13
76C	21
98C	26
98G	28

TRAINING

MOS training fill less than 95% and requirements are increasing.

FY81
LOW TRAINING FILL

<u>MOS</u>	<u>%</u>
05B	87
05H	85
13F	83
16S	80
31S	94
31T	51
45E	90
54C	90
63E	88
91Y	90
98C	51

MOS is training base shortfall or capacity constrained and manning objectives are increasing.

TRAINING CAPACITY CONSTRAINT

MOS
05D
05G
05H
13M
13R
33S
34Y
92B
98J

MOS course attrition rate above 20%, not decreasing and manning objectives are increasing.

OR

MOS course attrition rate above 25% and manning objectives are increasing.

FY81
HIGH COURSE ATTRITION

<u>MOS</u>	<u>RATE (%)</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>RATE (%)</u>
05D	35	31V	25
05G	30	33S	30
05H	38	34Y	48
13E	26	45E	22
19K	25	45G	42
24W	37	45T	25
27B	21	52C	21
27E	29	63Y	20
27F	34	67T	33
27G	28	71M	20
27N	34	74F	37
31E	42	93F	30
31S	31	98C	28
31T	42		

ATTRITION

Miscellaneous attrition rate exceeds 10% and requirements are increasing.

FY81
HIGH MISCELLANEOUS ATTRITION

<u>MOS</u>	<u>RATE (%)</u>
27E	15
27N	12
31E	14
31S	11
34Y	11
35R	15
36H	11
42E	14
45E	11
45G	14
45K	11
45L	12
54C	16
54E	11
55B	12
63G	11

RETENTION

MOS first-term and career combined retention rate less than 50% and manning objectives are increasing.

FY81 LOW RETENTION

<u>MOS</u>	<u>1ST TERM %</u>	<u>CAREER %</u>
17B	30	60
17M	26	67
27E	34	59
27G	38	60
45L	31	48
52C	28	47
52D	26	53
62F	47	44
62J	80	15
63G	52	42
63Y	42	53
67Y	28	63
68H	35	61
71M	38	43
92B	23	48
93F	38	57
98J	11	70

Migration rate out of low retention MOS exceeds migration rate into MOS and manning objectives are increasing.

FY81 HIGH OUT - MIGRATION

<u>MOS</u>	<u>IN/OUT RATIO</u>
17B	0:7
17M	1:10
45L	1:3
52D	1:5
63G	3:4
92B	1:4
98J	2:4

PREREQUISITES

MOS Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) prerequisite score attained by declining population by -5% or more and manning objectives are increasing.

FY77-FY80 ASVAB PREREQUISITE PERFORMANCE DECLINE

<u>MOS</u>	<u>SCORE</u>	<u>4-YEAR DIFF (%)</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>SCORE</u>	<u>4-YEAR DIFF (%)</u>
05B	SC95	-7	55B	QM85	-6
05G			57F		
17M			62F		
33S			62J		
13R	SC100	-6	42E	QM90	-6
17B			45T		
54E	ST90	-14	52C		
91Y			52D		
92B			68M		
05D	ST95	-18	45E	QM95	-5
05G			45L		
05H			54C		
13C			76V	CL90	-5
13E			76W		
96E			71M	CL95	-6
74F	ST100	-18	76J		
13M	OF100	-5			

GRADE
INFEASIBILITY

Heavy Division 86 transition increases grade infesible MOS structure. See VOL III (MOS PROJECTIONS).

NCO
SHORTAGES

Heavy Division 86 increases NCO manning objectives where shortages currently exist. See VOL III (MOS PROJECTIONS).

UNDERALIGNED
OFFICER
SPECIALTIES

Heavy Division 86 increases officer manning objectives for specialties which are underaligned. 66% utilization or above is considered underaligned.

FY81
UNDERALIGNED OFFICER SPECIALTIES
% BELOW UTILIZATION RATE CUTOFF

<u>SC</u>	<u>SPECIALTY</u>	<u>04</u>	<u>05</u>
12	Armor	-2	
13	Field Artillery	-5	
21	Engineer	-20	-21
44	Finance	-2	
74	Chemical		-20

CONTINUATION
PATTERN

Heavy Division 86 increases officer manning objectives for specialties with below average continuation patterns. Army average is 410% for 04 and 310% for 05.


FY81
OFFICER SPECIALTY
CONTINUATION PATTERN
% BELOW ARMY AVERAGE

<u>SC</u>	<u>SPECIALTY</u>	<u>04</u>	<u>05</u>
14	Air Defense	-2	
15	Aviation	-118	-51
36	Counterintelligence	-56	
44	Finance	-243	
71	Aviation Materiel Management	-197	
91	Maintenance Management	-181	-54
92	Materiel Services Management		-54


POTENTIAL
PROBLEM
SSI/MOS

Officer specialties and warrant officer and enlisted MOS which have been identified as having supportability problems are detailed in the following charts. These problem SSI/MOS are identified based on analysis of data contained in VOL I, Annex A (METHODOLOGY) and are also contained in VOL III (PROJECTIONS DATA).


13E CANNON FIELD ARTILLERY OFFICER



SSI 13E




BACKGROUND	-	Increase that occurs in FY82-83 is due to change from MTOE documentation in FY82 to TOE documentation in FY83. Other factors that influence the speciality are; 3x8 conversion, TACFIRE, and the Close Support Study Group II results
SYSTEMS	-	TACFIRE
ORGANIZATIONS	-	All FA units 3x8 OS unit conversion
TRAINING	-	If sharp increase does occur in FY82-83 it is doubtful that the Field Artillery School will be able to provide the necessary support
SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS	-	If large increase takes place in FY82 supportability problems will be created
RECOMMENDATIONS	-	The necessity of the requirements in FY83 must be reviewed to insure they are valid. If requirements are valid the planning must be changed



35A TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

SSI 35A



BACKGROUND

- Growth due to increased authorization for ACAB, Bde and Bn S-2 organizations. MI Bn (CEMI) activations also increase requirements

Most growth in grades O2 + O3

SYSTEMS

- NA

ORGANIZATIONS

- MI Bn (CEMI)

Bde + Bn S-2

ACAB

G-2

TRAINING

- NA


SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS

- Large increase of officers in this MOS. Supportability may be difficult

RECOMMENDATION

- To meet growth, within end strength constraints, accessions could be opened up and grade substitution used to meet ramp-up

91A MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT OFFICER



SSI 91A

BACKGROUND

This SSI increases 165 spaces (147%) for Div 86 Large Increase driven by organizational structure changes i.e., Maintenance Platoons have been split into sections with a commissioned officer in charge

50% of SC 91s designated at 8th VOS

SYSTEMS

NA

ORGANIZATIONS

Ground equipment maintenance platoon of in maintenance company in forward support battalion

Operational readiness float platoon HQs in DISCOM maintenance battalion

Reassignment of specialty requirements in maintenance units (i.e., 22A/9) switched to 91/72 for Hq and Lt Maint Co (cdr)

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS

Is supportable; however, priorities may not allow it


RECOMMENDATION

NONE

91B **ARMAMENT/MECHANIZED MAINTENANCE OFFICER**

SSI 91B


BACKGROUND	-	This SSI increases 33 spaces (16x) for Div 86 Increase results from change of 76A position (Plt Ldr) to 91B slots in maintenance units 50% of SC 91s designated at 8th YDS
SYSTEMS	-	NA
ORGANIZATIONS	-	NA
TRAINING	-	NA
SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS	-	Is supportable; However, priorities may not allow it
RECOMMENDATION	-	NONE



92A

S&S MANAGEMENT OFFICER

SSI 92A



BACKGROUND

This SSI increases 278 spaces (257s) for Div 86
Currently shortage SSI

SYSTEMS

NA

ORGANIZATIONS

Restructure of DISCOM to include 8de
Spt Bn is a major factor in the
plus-up of 92A

TRAINING

Entry level SSI

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS

Supportability is questionable as
supply and service operations increase
proportionally throughout the Lt Div,
Corps and EAC units


Currently not enough Lts are being
accessed to fill authorized posi-
tions

RECOMMENDATIONS

NONE


92B **MATERIEL MANAGEMENT OFFICER**

SSI 92B



BACKGROUND	-	This SSI increases 30 spaces (18%) for Div 86
SYSTEMS	-	NA
ORGANIZATIONS	-	Restructure of DISCOM to include the Bde Spt Bn
TRAINING	-	Entry level accession
SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS	-	If increases in 92B is carried through into Lt Div Corps and TAC it is doubtful that it can be supported Current accession of 92 into the Army is insufficient to meet todays authorization
RECOMMENDATION	-	NONE


100B UTILITY/OBSERVATION HELICOPTER PILOT



BACKGROUND

MOS 100B

Over the past three years, MOS 100B has experienced an inordinate degree of personnel turbulence and the highest attrition rate of all the MOS's in this occupational group. The turbulence is primarily attributed to this MOS being the feeder for all others within the aviation field. The high service attrition is due, in part, to the fact that most of the aviator warrant officers in OAV status are 100B. In FY80, 60 percent of those who left the service prior to reaching retirement eligibility did so after completing their three year initial obligation. Requirements for this MOS increase from 781 in FY81 to 899 in FY91.



SYSTEMS

Utility/Observation Helicopters

ORGANIZATIONS

Units with Utility/Observation Helicopters


TRAINING

Training rate for warrant officer aviators is 808 per year

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS

Even though requirements for MOS 100B increase by only a 118 spaces over the next 10 years, it is doubtful that manning can be achieved given the current trend for this MOS.

630A AUTOMOTIVE REPAIRER TECHNICIAN



MDS 630A

BACKGROUND

This MDS increases 80 spaces (29%) for Div 86
Currently at 97% fill of endstrength of 1000
Procurement goal for FY81 was 132; only procured
75
Low procurement rate due to approximately
50% of applicants being unable to meet
qualifications for appointment

SYSTEMS

NA

ORGANIZATIONS

NA

TRAINING

NA


SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS

Difficult to support unless changes made in
procurement methodology

RECOMMENDATION

NONE

982A **TRAFFIC ANALYST OFFICER**




MDS 982A

BACKGROUND	-	98C 1a feeder MDS Increases by 67% Div 86
SYSTEMS	-	NA
ORGANIZATIONS	-	MI Bn (CENT)
TRAINING	-	NA
SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS	-	NTIP priority detracts from Div 86 supportability
RECOMMENDATION	-	NONE

983A **EMANATIONS ANALYST OFFICER**

MOS 983A



BACKGROUND	-	98J feeds this MOS Increases by 60% Div 86
SYSTEMS	-	NA
ORGANIZATIONS	-	MI 8n (CEMI)
TRAINING	-	NA
SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS	-	Difficult to support due to low I of 98J
RECOMMENDATION	-	NONE

PROJECTIONS
DATA

The following is an explanation of the projections chart found on the enlisted charts that follow.

Chart used for each enlisted MOS:

ROW	MOS			ACCESSION			TRAINING		
				CRIT SKILL	ED (R)	TNGPGM FILL %	CAP	TIME WKS	LEAD MOS
1	A			B	C	D	E	F	G
				TTHS	ATTRITION		RETENTION		
	CUR OPSTR	AUTH	FACES	%	CBS %	MISC %	BEENL % 1877M/CAN	MIG % IN/OUT	SAB A B C
2	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	Q	P1 P2 P3
3	(A"Y")	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X %
4	(A"ALB2")	Y	Z	AA	BB	CC	DD	EE	FF %
5	(Y"ALB1")	GG	HH	II	JJ	KK	LL	MM	NN %
	MALE/FEMALE		CONUS/OCONUS		MOS PREREQ		TRADEOFFS		
	MALE %	FEM %	CONUS %	OCONUS %	SCORE	POPUL %			
6	QQ	PP	QQ	RR	SS	TT	UU		

The rows are numbered and the blocks are lettered in this example in order to refer back to appropriate rows and blocks when describing the methodology used to determine the numbers in each MOS chart.

ROW 1

The data in all the blocks of row 1 were extracted directly from the MOS matrix at Annex B of Volume 1.

ROW 2

The FY81 operating strength in block 2H and the FY81 authorizations in block 2I were extracted from the requirements data in Volume II. Block 2J is the difference between blocks 2H and 2I. If authorizations were smaller than the operating strength, the number was shown as a minus. The percentages in blocks 2K thru 2Q and the numbers in block 2P were extracted from the MOS matrix in Annex B of Volume 1.

ROW 3

The authorizations in block 3Q are the FY85 or interim conversion figures extracted from the requirements data in Volume II. Block 3R is the difference between FY85 authorizations and the FY81 operating strength in block 2H. The numbers in blocks 3S thru 3W were obtained by applying those percentages to the authorizations in block 3Q. These numbers were determined in the following manner.

$$\text{BLOCK 3S} = 3Q + (1-2K)$$

$$\text{BLOCK 3T} = [(FY85 \text{ E-3's} - 2H \text{ E-3's}) + (1-2L)] - [(FY85 \text{ E-3's} - 2H \text{ E-3's})] + 3S$$

$$\text{BLOCK 3U} = [(FY85 \text{ E-3's} - 2H \text{ E-3's}) + (1-2M)] - [(FY85 \text{ E-3's} - 2H \text{ E-3's})] + 3T$$

$$\text{BLOCK 3V} = 3U + X + Y$$

$$(X = [(FY85 \text{ E-1's thru E-4's}) - (2H \text{ E-1's thru E-4's})] + \text{1st term reenlistment rate}) - [(FY85 \text{ E-1's thru E-4's}) - (2H \text{ E-1's thru E-4's})]$$

$$(Y = [(FY85 \text{ E-5's and above}) - (2H \text{ E-5's and above})] + \text{careerists reenlistment rate}) - [(FY85 \text{ E-5's and above}) - (2H \text{ E-5's and above})]$$

$$\text{BLOCK 3W} = [(\text{Reenlistment in} - \text{reenlistment out}) \times 3Q] + 3V$$

$$\text{BLOCK 3X} = 3W + 3Q$$

ROW 4 and 5

The numbers in row 4 and 5 were determined in the same manner as above except in row 4 FY91, or full modernization, authorizations were substituted for FY81 and in row 5 the Y-series, or objective division, authorizations were substituted as a basis of comparison with the March 81 supportability assessment.

ROW 6

The data in blocks 6QQ thru 6TT were extracted from MOS matrix at Annex B of Volume 1. Block 6UU identifies space tradeoffs, by MOS, associated with system and structure changes (e.g., with the introduction of the IFV, MOS 11M increases, with a corresponding decrease, or tradeoff, in MOS 11B).

The line graph illustrates the annual number of deaths from malaria in India from 1981 to 1991. The vertical axis (Y-axis) measures the number of deaths, ranging from 10 to 90 in increments of 10. The horizontal axis (X-axis) represents the years from 1981 to 1991. The data points are connected by a line, showing a fluctuating but generally increasing trend over the decade.

Year	Number of Deaths
1981	39
1982	52
1983	52
1984	54
1985	72
1986	72
1987	72
1988	77
1989	72
1990	72
1991	72

MALE	FEMALE	CONUS/CONUS	MOS PRIREQ
MALE	FEM	CONUS/CONUS	SCORE POPUL
72	28	32	68
			34

MOS OSD

BACKGROUND - 124X strength world-wide
102X 10 Navy Div
Increase of 33 spaces
Increase caused by Trailblazer
68X SMOOS - Jun 81
28X Female
Grade infeasible E3-E4, E4-E5
Trailblazer


SYSTEMS -

ORGANIZATIONS - MI Bn (CMT)

TRAINING - Training base capacity constrained
TTHS - 21X
35X course attrition
29 week training time

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS - Requirements for Div 86 difficult to support although at over 100X
MOS has been intensively managed to bring up to strength
Recruiting
M7IP
Tag Base


RECOMMENDATIONS - Field equipment to all divisions at approximately the same time to eliminate SMOOS problem



E9	(0)
E8	(0)
E7	(0)
E6	60
E5	127 (103)
E4	103 (86)
E3	71 (75)

GRADE FEASIBILITY

05H ELECTRONIC WARFARE/SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE MORSE INTERCEPTOR



MOS		ACCESSION			TRAINING			
05H	CRIT	EO	INSPEC	SAP	TIME	LEAD		
	SKILL	(H)	FILL %				WKS	MOS
	—	3	85				✓	24
		ATTENTION			RETENTION			
SUB OPSTB	AUTH	FACES	%	CAS	MISC	RECHL	MIS	SAB
76	84	+ 8	38	8	84/64	2/2	3	0
1171	118	+ 42	52	46	45	84	84	199
11711021	120	+ 44	54	48	47	8	8	17
11711011	30	+ 14	18	11	11	-30	-30	-210
TRADEOFFS		MOS PREREQ			TRADEOFFS			
MALE/FEMALE	CONUS/OCNUS	CONUS/OCNUS	SCORE	POPUL				
76	24	43	59	34				

MOS OSW

BACKGROUND

Increase of 36 spaces based on fielding of NP/WHF around based jammer (TACJAN, TRAFFIC JAM)

Currently 100% strength - Jul 81

90% strength Navy Div

SIHOS - 59% - Jun 81

24% Female

SYSTEMS

TACJAN

TRAFFIC JAM

TRAIL BLAZER

ORGANIZATIONS

MI Op (CENT)

MI Bn (CENT)

MI Co (CENT)

TRAINING

24 week sig time

High course attrition - 38%

High TMS - 23%

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS

MOS has high NP/WHF draw



Future NP/WHF requirements may make this MOS difficult to support for the tactical structure

If current strength can be kept up supportability may be possible

RECOMMENDATION

Bring issue of NP/WHF priority up as a definite detractor to CENT supportability

High course attrition due to learning International Morse Code may need to raise 51



MOS 134

BACKGROUND

- New MOS for MLRS
- MLRS will not be deployed in divisions until FY83
- Only grades E-3 thru E5 are authorized for this MOS
- Personnel will convert to 15D at E6 level
- Has been identified as a critical MOS
- Since this is new MOS data for a similar MOS, 15D, was used for charts

SYSTEM

- Operators for MLRS

ORGANIZATION

- One battery of 9 launchers in each GS battalion

TRAINING



- Similar MOS, 15D, has a course completion rate of 75%
- Initial training and sharp increase in first 3 years may create training constraint


SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS

- Supportability of this MOS will depend upon the ability of the Field Artillery School to establish a large enough training base to accommodate initial requirements. Supportability will also depend on the ability at the Recruiting Command to provide enough enlistees to fill initial requirements

RECOMMENDATION

- Plans for recruiting and training of 134's must be finalized and published as soon as possible





MOS			ACCESSION			TRAINING		
SND OP/STD	AUTH	FACES	TTHS	ATTRITION		CAP	TIME WKS	LEAD MOS
				ED 101	INSPECT FILL %			
65	220	355	55	9	104	CON	7	27
14-T-1	387	322	716	720	725	771	739	320
14-AL08-1	371	306	680	684	688	735	704	203
14-AL01-1	0	-65						

TRADEOFFS		
MALE/FEMALE	CONUS/OCNUS	MOS PREFERRED
MALE FEM	CONUS OCNUS	SCORE POPUL
90 10	25 75%	5C100 27

MDS 13R

BACKGROUND

MDS has been identified as a critical MDS

New MDS for operating Q36 and Q37 radar

MDS is SIMDS with 75% of personnel stationed overseas

As requirements for 13R increase 17B requirements will decrease

Recruitment rates are above Army average

13R converts to 17B at E7 level

E7 authorizations for 17B will not support both 17B and 13R requirements

E5 authorizations will not support E6 requirements

SYSTEMS

Operators for Q36 and Q37 Firefinder Radars

ORGANIZATIONS

Found in 1st Acq Batteries at Div Arty

TRAINING

New equipment training will be conducted for 17B personnel reclassified into 13R



Course attrition rate is 19% but has shown steep increase in last six months

Sharp ramp-up in FY82 and FY83 may create training constraints



SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS

Initial support from MDS comes from reclassified 17B's

E5 authorizations and 17B E7 authorizations must be reviewed to identify additional positions



13T
RPV CREWMAN



MOS			ACCESSION			TRAINING		
ENR OF	AUTH	FACES	YTHS %	ATTN	TRNG	CAP	TIME WKS	LEAD MOS
131								
0	0	0						
11-11-11	51	+51						
11-11-11	51B	+51B						
11-11-11	0							

TRADEOFFS	
CONUS/OCONUS	MOS PREREQ
CONUS	POPUL
SCORE	

MALE/FEMALE	CONUS/OCONUS	MOS PREREQ
MALE	CONUS	SCORE
FEMALE	POPUL	

MOS 131

BACKGROUND

- New MOS for RPV Crewmember
- Two lines on chart project 131 requirements with and without the FLIR. FLIR requirements were not available when data base was created
- FLIR requirements do not improve grade feasibility problems
- E7 positions are included in FLIR requirements

SYSTEMS

- RPV with FLIR

ORGANIZATIONS

- Target Acq Btry and Bn
- Fielding of RPV is supposed to occur with transition from 1st Acq Btry to a Battalion

TRAINING

- New course will be initiated at Ft Sill
- Sharp increases over first four years may create training constraint



SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS

- Initial authorizations indicate that MOS will experience grade feasibility problems
- Supportability will depend upon ability of the Recruiting Command and school to meet initial requirements


RECOMMENDATION

- Grade structure should be reviewed to insure best possible structure is obtained

Plans for recruiting and training 131 must be completed and published as soon as possible



13W FIELD ARTILLERY TARGET ACQUISITION SENIOR SERGEANT



MOS		ACCESSION			TRAINING		
	13W	CHIT	EN	UNCPER	CAP	TIME	LEAD
		SKILL	(IN)	FULL %		WES	MOS
		ATTENTION			RETENTION		
	FACES	TTHS	CAS	MISC	REENT	MIS	SRB
		%	%	%	100/100	100/100	A/B/C
31	68	5	-	-	100	2	-
10-77	70	41	41	41	41	42	102 %
10-3102	88	60	60	60	60	61	107 %
11-3101	88	60	60	60	60	61	107 %

TRADEOFFS

MOS PREREQ

CONUS/OCONUS

CONUS/OCONUS

SCORE

POPUL

MALE/FEMALE

MALE

FEMALE

100

0

54

46

-

	E3	E4	E5	E6	E7	E8	E9
GRADE CHANGES							

MOS 134

BACKGROUND - MOS is capter for the following target acquisition MOS's 17B, 17C, 82C and 93F. MOS has traditionally been understrength. Current strength is 54%.

Feeder MOS's at E7 level are less than 80% filled.

Increase due to conversion to Tgt Acq Bn's.

SYSTEMS - No specific systems

ORGANIZATIONS - Target Acquisition Batteries at Dir Arty and new Tgt Acq Bn's


TRAINING - NA

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS - MOS will remain understrength because of strengths in feeder MOS's

RECOMMENDATION - Shortages will have to be made up by grade substitution which will compound the problem of existing shortages at E7 level. The long term solution is to improve the retention rates in feeder MOS's

	E3	E4	E5	E6	E7	E8	E9
GRADE FEASIBILITY							

CANNON/MISSILE SENIOR SERGEANT

[illegible]

BACKGROUND

Copper MOS for the following Cannon and Missile MOS's 13B, 13C, 13F, 15D, 15E and 15J

WOS has traditionally been understrength
Current strength is 64%

SYSTEMS

三

ORGANIZATIONS

All FA Battalions and Div Arty

TRAINING

MA

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS

MOS will remain understrength because feeder MOSs at E7 level are only 85% filled

RECOMMENDATION


Shortages will have to be made up by grade substitution which will adversely impact on existing shortage of £7. Long term solution is to improve retention rates in feeder MOS's

[illegible]

E9	
E8	880 H
E7	(875)
E6	
E5	
E4	
E3	

GRADE FEASIBILITY

15D MLRS SERGEANT



MOS		ACCESSION			TRAINING		
CUR OF STN	AUTN	FACES	CRIT	ED	TIME	LEAD	
			SKILL	INI	WEG	MOS	
15D			-	2.5	0	-	
		ATTENTION			RETENTION		
CUR OF STN	AUTN	FACES	TTHS	CSG	REENT	MIG	SRD
			%	%	100	13	3
25	0	-25	17	-	77	13	2
100	96	71	86	86	112	105	148
110	160	135	163	163	209	196	145
110	830	805	970	970	1063	983	122
		TRADEOFFS					
MALE/FEMALE		CONUS/OCNUS		MOS PREREQ			
MALE FEM		CONUS OCNUS		SCORE POPUL			
93	7	24	76	-	-	134	

MOS 150

BACKGROUND - 13M personnel convert to this MOS at E6 level
No requirements for this MOS until MLRS is fielded
MOS is SIMOS with 76S of personnel stationed overseas
13M and 15D E5 authorizations are almost equal to E6 authorizations
High migration of 13S out of MOS



SYSTEMS - Crew chief for MLRS

ORGANIZATION - One battery with 9 launchers per GS battalion


TRAINING - A four week course for cadre personnel will be conducted at Ft Sill in conjunction with deployment schedules

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS - Grade imbalance problems have been recognized by the Field Artillery School and recommendations have been made to correct problems
Increased requirements for Div 86 will increase SIMOS problems
SIMOS situation is contributing factor to high migration out of MOS

RECOMMENDATION - SIMOS problems are created by the requirements for 15D personnel in the Lance Battalions. Additional COMUS COMUS positions should be established to alleviate SIMOS situation





17M REMOTE SENSOR OPERATOR




MOS		ACCESSION			TRAINING		
17M	CHIT SKILL	ED IN	INSPER FULL %	CAP	TIME WKS	LEAD WKS	MOS
	—		100		5	27	
		ATTENTION			DETENTION		
SUB OPSTN	AUTO	FACES	CAR %	MISC %	REENTL WKS	MISC WKS	SUB AID C
10	0	-10	9	8	26/67	1/10	
11	103	+93	103	109	268	276	297
11	200	+190	209	218	562	579	304
11	120	+110	121	126	382	392	356
		CONUS/OCONUS			TRADEOFFS		
MALE/FEMALE	FEM	CONUS %	OCONUS %	MOS PREREQ	SCORE	POPUL	
100	0	70	30	EL85 SC95	27	36	

MOS 17M

- BACKGROUND 1165 strength World-wide
Each division requires 20+ 17M
Performs as operator and
organizational maintainer
Grade infeasible E4-E5
- SYSTEMS Remotely Monitored Battlefield
Sensor System (REMBASS)
- ORGANIZATIONS MI CD (CEMI)
MI BN (CEMI)
- TRAINING Increase when REMBASS is fielded, may
constrain tng base
24% course attrition
- SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS MOS in holding status awaiting
fielding of REMBASS
Qualified MCO's may ETS or ask for
reclass if fielding of REMBASS
stretches out
- RECOMMENDATION NONE



27E TOW/Dragon REPAIRER



MOS		ACCESSION			TRAINING			
27E		CHIT	CB	TRAPER	CAP	TIME	LEAD	MOS
		SKILL	INI	FILL %				
				101		12		26
		ATTENTION			RETENTION			
		TTHS	CB	MISC	REENT	MIC	AD	C
		FACES	%	%	100%	100%	100%	100%
153	230	477	23	15	34	59	2	1 1 0
10" 11"	558	+405	526	563	1147	1147	1147	283 %
10" 1101"	558	+405	526	547	1128	1128	1129	279 %
10" 1101"	608	+455	591	634	1300	1300	1300	286 %
		MOS PREREQ			TRADEOFFS			
		MALE/FEMALE	CONUS/OCONUS	SCORE				
		MALE	FEM	CONUS	OCONUS	SCORE	POPUL	
97	3	50	50	50	51			

MOS 27E

BACKGROUND

- Requirements for this MOS increased by more than 100% for FY81 - FY84. In view of the fact that this MOS is already understrength, there appear to be substantial problems ahead

SYSTEMS

- TOW/Dragon
TOW/Dragon Night Sights

ORGANIZATIONS

- Armor, Mech and Cav Units

TRAINING



- High attrition rates. Possibly the requisit EL score is too low. Reenlistment low

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS

- Not supportable at this time



RECOMMENDATIONS

- Increase entry score, increase re-up bonus and more emphasis on recruiting




MOS 27N

BACKGROUND	-	New MOS Increase in requirements are previous 27FN2 requirements MOS also supports light division and non divisional systems
SYSTEMS	-	No additional or new systems
ORGANIZATIONS	-	Restructured MSL/NPN Sys Spt Co
TRAINING	-	Equipment oriented
SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS	-	YIMS, attrition and retention rates of MOS 27F were used for 27N. A shortage in grade E5/E6 is projected upon completion of reclassification
RECOMMENDATION	-	Take action to improve promotion opportunity to grades E5/E6



BAL/LC/LAD SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE CHIEF



MOS			ACCESSION			TRAINING		
CDB OPSTR	AUTH	FACES	CHIT SKILL	ED ID	TNGPGR FILL %	CAP	TIME WES	LEAD 'MOS
272								
			TYTHS			RETENTION		
			%	CBS %	MISC %	REENTL (1111111111)	MIG IN OUT	SBS A B C
11	18	7	.6	--	--	NA/91	0/0	--
1A-T	30	19	20	--	--	22	--	116
1A-ALOP	30	19	20	--	--	22	--	116
1A-ALOP	20	9	10	--	--	11	--	122

TRADEOFFS	
MALE/FEMALE	CONUS/OCONUS
MALE	FEM
100	0

MOS PREREO	
CONUS/OCONUS	POPUL
CONUS	OCONUS
SCORE	%
--	--

CAPPER MOS FOR CHF 27	
100	0

MOS 272

BACKGROUND - Copper MOS for CMF 27
Increases driven by organization and equipment changes that increase requirements in CMF 27
Current operating strength (71%)



SYSTEMS - Land combat and light Air Defense Systems

ORGANIZATIONS - Restructure MSL/NPH Sys Spt Co

TRAINING - NA

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS - MOS requirements increase by 280% over current operating strength in 3 years
Increase will aggravate shortage within MOS unless immediate action is taken

RECOMMENDATION - Take action to improve promotion to grade E8 within CMF 27 in FY82/84



Year	Deaths
1917	81
1918	187
1919	81
1920	84

MOS		ACCESSION			TRAINING		
315		CRIT	ED	INSPCM	CAP	TIME WKS	LEAD MOS
		SKILL	(IN)	FILL %			
				94		32	33
		TTHS		ATTRITION		RETENTION	
CVR OFTDR	AUTH	△ FACES	%	CHS %	MISC %	REENTL MIS	SAB
111	84	-27	21	31	11	51 76 5 / 4	A B C 1
1A"77"	151	40	51	81	90	126	313 %
1A"AL02"	120	9	11	33	39	54	595 %
1A"AL01"	260	149	189	228	239	338	275 %

MALE/FEMALE		CONUS/CONUS		MOS PRIREQ		TRADEOFFS
MALE %	FEM %	CONUS %	CONUS %	SCORE	POPUL %	
96	4	50	50	ELL15	10	

MOS 315

BACKGROUND

Operating @ 99%
Div Sig Bn increases by 176 spaces
(30 overall). Div 86 increases a
total of 176 spaces
TTMS high 21%
High score required EL-115

SYSTEMS

Field Comsec Systems; Vinson;
KW-7 etc

ORGANIZATIONS

Div Sig Bn
Maintenance Bn

TRAINING


Training time is long 32 wks
Attrition is high - 31'

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS

Not supportable. The requirement is
probably misstated. The Comsec
Logistics Study still not finalized,
gives DISCOM the DS Maint Role
for all Division Comsec. The SIG
Bn would still repair organic
equip. Since the Comsec Logistics
Study has yet to be finalized it
is questionable how many spaces 315
will increase or decrease. A Signal
school study to reduce training
time is currently being staffed and
should reduce the TTMS substantially
if implemented. Div 86 critical

RECOMMENDATION

NONE



E0	
E6	
E7	44
E8	104
E9	175 (171)
E4	116 (115)
E3	142 (173)

GRADE FEASIBILITY

Year	Deaths
1981	36
1982	37
1983	37
1984	66
1985	37
1986	42
1987	40
1988	40
1989	40
1990	40
1991	40

TRADEOFFS

MOS 317

BACKGROUND

- Operating @ 822
TTMS is high
SINOS MOS 60% CONUS
Retention for careerist is low 31%
Migration in is high 10%
Training fill is low 51%
Merges into 315 @ E6
Grade infeasible

SYSTEMS

- Tactical Comsec equip

ORGANIZATIONS

- Div Sig Bn
Div Maint Bn

TRAINING



- Training time is long - 33wks
Currently attrition is high 42%
Training fill is low 51%

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS



- Not supportable. The MOS is not supportable as presently configured. The space requirements which, will decrease or increase as a result of the Comsec Logistics Study have not been finalized. (see also 315). There is an anticipated training shortfall of at least 59% (102 reservations/247 projected). This MOS is currently being studied at the Signal school for possible major changes. Div 86 critical

RECOMMENDATION

- NONE



33S EW/INTEP SYSTEMS REPAIRER



MOS				ACCESSION				TRAINING			
33S				GRIT	ER	INTEP	WILL %	CAP	TIME	LEAD	MOS
				SKILL	181	181	99	✓	WKS	35	34
				TTHS	ATTRITION			RETENTION			
				△	FACE	FACE	MISC	BEHL	MIC	IN	5
OP	PTH	86	100	110	270	4222	359	354	444	431	194
MALE/FEMALE	CONUS/OCNUS	MOS	PREREQ	SCORE	POPUL	TRADEOFFS					
MALE	FEM	CONUS	OCNUS	SCORE	POPUL						
99	1	51	49	5095	36						

MOS 335

BACKGROUND - 355 1st term re-up rate
Only MOS in CMF 33
Repairs all EM equipment at both tactical and strategic level
70% strength world-wide
Grade infeasible E4-E5, Div B6 aggravates problem at E5


SYSTEMS - TRAILBLAZER, TEAMPACK, QUICKFIX TAC/JM

ORGANIZATIONS - MI Bn (CEMI)

TRAINING - Tng base constrained
Output not close to requirements
34 week tng time
30% attrition

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS - MFIP priority hurts CEMI
Of 70% strength - 53% E5
49% E6
Supportability to Div B6 not likely
Study to determine if 335 should be broken up into 3 or more MOS in progress
High civilian demand


RECOMMENDATION - Unable to recruit 1st termers-may have to pay more than current max re-up rate allows



E9	(9)
E8	(34)
E7	(175)
E6	176
E5	316
E4	336
E3	(231)
	(306)
	(231)
	(0)

GRADE FEASIBILITY

35U BIOMED EQUIPMENT SPECIALIST (ADVANCED)



MOS			ACCESSION			TRAINING		
35U	CHIT	ES	ENG/PER	CAP	TIME	LEAD		
	SKILL	INT	FILL %		WKS	MOS		
TTHS			ATTENTION		RETENTION			
	%	CBS	MISC	DEENL	MIS	35U		
		%	%	2/0	2/0	A B C		
0	6	13	4	-	57	1 1 0		
11-11-11								
11-11-11								
11-11-11								
CONUS/OCONUS			TRADEOFFS					
MALE/FEMALE		CONUS/OCONUS	MOS PREREQ					
MALE	FEM	CONUS	OCONUS	SCORE	POPUL			
97	3	73	27	-	-			

MOS 35U

BACKGROUND

- MOS increases 25 spaces (1921) for Div 86 organization
- World-wide operating strength 91%
- Div 86 units operating strength 62%
- Low density MOS

SYSTEMS

- NA

ORGANIZATIONS

- Restructure of the DISCOM to include FMD Spt Bn put 1 E6 in ea Fwd Spt Bn

TRAINING



- Course completion rate 83%

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS

- MOS appears unsupportable in the current grade structure. The reduction of all E5 and the elimination of the 35G MOS created a SGA that may not be supportable


RECOMMENDATIONS

- Consideration be given to restructure the TOE to include the E5 35U, to relieve some of the pressure of trying to grow instant 35U30



Extent of Polymerization (X)	Ratio R_p/R_m
81	163
82	329
83	237
84	274
85	316
86	352
87	461
88	540
89	633
90	705
91	774

MOS			ACCESSION			TRAINING		
	EXIT SKILL	EB INI	CURPGR FILL %	CAP	TIME WKS	LEAD MOS		
45T								
				97		8	27	
			ATTENTION		RETENTION			
YTHS	%	CSB %	MISC %	REENTL	NIG	AND		
				100	100	100	100	100
71	+92	46	25	9	482	482	197	197
(H"U")	+245	454	475	482	482	482	197	197
(H"AL02")	+703	1302	1366	1305	1385	1385	197	197
(H"AL01")	+720	1334	1408	1430	1430	1430	199	199
MALE/FEMALE			CONUS/OCONUS		MOS PREREQ		TRADEOFFS	
MALE	FEM	CONUS	OCONUS	SCORE	POPUL			
100	0	12	88	2490	50			



MOS 45T

The requirements for 45T increase as the Bradley Fighting Vehicles fielded. Much of the support for this MOS will come from reclassified MOS 45N

BACKGROUND

SYSTEMS

ITV

Bradley Fighting Vehicles

ORGANIZATIONS

Mech Bns

Cav Units

TRAINING


Initial Entry Training as base is expanded. NETT training for personnel is field. Attrition rate appears high for just classes. Improved grade feasibility under Div 86

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS


The ability to recruit, train and retain desired numbers of quality personnel will determine overall supportability of this MOS

RECOMMENDATION

NONE



456 FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS REPAIRER



MOS			ACCESSION			TRAINING		
456			CBIT SKILL	ED INI	RESPON FILL %	CAP	TIME WKS	LEAD MOS
					97		29	33
			ATTENTION			RETENTION		
ENR OF STN	AUTH	FACES	TTHS	CHS %	MISC %	BEENL	MIS	SAB
0	1	+1	47	42	14	62	67	13
1A-T-1	190	+190	359	366	367	472	450	237
1A-ALB-1	190	+190	359	366	367	472	450	237
1A-ALB-1	0							

TRADEOFFS		
MALE/FEMALE	CONUS/OCNUS	MOS PREREQ
96	4	50
51	50	EL95

MOS 45G

BACKGROUND

- This is a new system (1 Sep 81), specific MOS split-out from 34G MOS 34Y was also splitout as Field Artillery Computer Repairer. The 45G performs and supervises direct and general support maintenance on combat vehicle fire control systems and related test equipment. Increase in requirements for this MOS reflects the number of tank systems in the inventory during the Div 86 transition period

SYSTEMS

- Laser Rangefinder
Electronic Ballistic Computers
Tank Thermal sights
Ground Laser Locator Designators

ORGANIZATIONS

- Maint Bn's, Mech and Armor Bn's

TRAINING



- Long course and very high attrition rates
Migration Into MOS is fairly high reflecting SRB. Re-up rate is good

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS

- Unless more emphasis is placed on recruiting and retention this MOS is not supportable. Since migration to 45G is good, more emphasis might be concentrated in this area. Grade feasibility should be monitored closely. Could become a SIMOS problem

RECOMMENDATION

- NONE



GRADE FEASIBILITY

Extent of Polymerization (X)	Ratio R_p/R_m
81	229
82	340
83	340
84	504
85	541
86	560
87	578
88	578
89	578
90	578
91	578

MOS		ACCESSION			TRAINING		
52C		CHIT SKILL	ED INI	UNGPEN FILL %	CAP	TIME MRS	LEAD MOS
		-	-	101	-	11	28
		TTHS ATTENTION			RETENTION		
SUR OP/STA	AUTH	FACES	CAS %	MISC %	REENTL 100	MIG IN 2 OUT	SRB A B C
208	229	+21	9	9	28	3	-
11"11"	541	333	366	406	421	1107	1101
11"1108"	584	+376	414	459	475	1341	1333
11"1101"	650	+442	486	523	537	1561	1552

TRADEOFFS	
MALE/FEMALE	CONUS/OCONUS
MALE FEM	CONUS OCONUS
95	5

MOS PRERO	
SCORE	POPUL
CH90	50

MOS 52C

BACKGROUND


- Div 86 MOS requirements increase by 155% (355 spaces)

- 1st term and careerist reenlistment rates are considerably below the Army-wide average

- MOS is approaching SIMOS at 50%

- MOS is grade infeasible

- Feeds into MOS 620 at E7



SYSTEMS

- Bottle cleaning, charging station; AM/TM-A (primary system causing plus-up)

ORGANIZATIONS

- NA

TRAINING

- Course completion rate is 79%


- Bordering capacity constraint due to lack of instructors

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS

- NONE


RECOMMENDATION

- NONE



GRADE FEASIBILITY

54E NBC SPECIALIST



MOS		ACCESSION			TRAINING				
64E	FACES	CHIT	ED	INTEPER	CAP	TIME	LEAD		
		SKILL	(b)	FILL %				WES	MOS
		-	2.5	101					
TTHS		ATTENTION		REYENTION					
64E	64E	%	64E	WISC	DEEHL	MIS	64E		
1,621	1,562	5	13	11	70	18	0		
14,171	2,288	703	677	656	1014	894	134 %		
14,116	2,710	1147	1137	1128	1462	1266	116 %		
14,118	2,901	1453	1439	1427	1871	1623	118 %		
MALE/FEMALE		CONUS/OCONUS		MOS PREREQ		TRADEOFFS			
MALE	FEM	CONUS	OCONUS	SCORE	POPUL				
85	15	53	47	5190	46				

MOS 54E

BACKGROUND

- Chemical Corps revitalization began FY79
FY79 NBC Defense Co start activations
FY80 first authorizations for E5 company level NBC MCD
Increases due to increase in 52C NBC Defense Co, addition of M12A1 decon App and one 54E to all Bn size units, addition of recon element to Cav Sqdn

SYSTEMS

- M12A1 SX-D mounted Decon Apparatus

ORGANIZATIONS

- NBC Def Co
Cav Sqdn, Recon Plt
All Co sized units
All Bn, Bde and Division HQ

TRAINING



- School capacity should support increase

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS


- Supportable only thru extensive grade substitution

RECOMMENDATION

- MOS is grade infeasible at E5
MOS structure be revised to alleviate E5 grade infeasibility
Reevaluation of new structure
A shortage of Decon Apparatus may slow down increase in E4 requirements



54Z CHEMICAL SENIOR SERGEANT



MOS				ACCESSION			TRAINING		
54Z				ENTRY SKILL	ED INI	THRESHOLD FILL %	CAP	TIME WKS	LEAD MOS
				AUTH	FACE	CS	RETENL	RETEN	
OP	ATN	FACE		%	%	%	REENTL	MIG	ABIC
0	18	+10		5	-	-	- / 100	0 / 0	
0000	30	+22		24				0	100 %
000000	30	+31		33				0	100 %
0000000	0	-9						0	100 %

TRADEOFFS			
MALE/FEMALE	CONUS/OCNUS	MOS PREREQ	
MALE FEM	CONUS OCNUS	SCORE	POPUL
100 0	0 100	-	-


MOS 542

- This is a copper MOS for CMF 54

BACKGROUND

- NA


SYSTEMS



- NBC Defense Co

ORGANIZATIONS

Div Hq



- NA

TRAINING


- FY84 increase will be difficult to support other than through grade substitution

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS

- NONE

RECOMMENDATIONS

55B AMMUNITION SPECIALIST



MOS			ACCESSION			TRAINING		
55B	AMMO SPEC	FACER	ENIT	ED	INSPEC	CAP	TIME	LEAD
			SKILL	INI	FILL %		WKS	MOS
					109/		5	27
			ATTENTION			RETENTION		
55B	AMMO SPEC	FACER	TTHS	%	MISC	REENT	MIG	SAB
					%	10/11/12/13/14/15/16/17/18/19/20/21/22/23/24/25/26/27/28/29/30/31/32/33/34/35/36/37/38/39/40/41/42/43/44/45/46/47/48/49/50/51/52/53/54/55/56/57/58/59/60/61/62/63/64/65/66/67/68/69/70/71/72/73/74/75/76/77/78/79/80/81/82/83/84/85/86/87/88/89/90/91/92/93/94/95/96/97/98/99/100/	IN 2/3/4/5/6/7/8/9/10/11/12/13/14/15/16/17/18/19/20/21/22/23/24/25/26/27/28/29/30/31/32/33/34/35/36/37/38/39/40/41/42/43/44/45/46/47/48/49/50/51/52/53/54/55/56/57/58/59/60/61/62/63/64/65/66/67/68/69/70/71/72/73/74/75/76/77/78/79/80/81/82/83/84/85/86/87/88/89/90/91/92/93/94/95/96/97/98/99/100/	A B C
397	111	-86	10	2	12	57/69	4/3	1 1 0
11*11	725	528	587	590	610	957	952	160 %
11*1102	881	684	760	744	792	1243	1236	%
11*1101	787	590	655	658	681	1072		%
			TRADEOFFS					
MALE/FEMALE			CONUS/OCNUS	MOS PREREQ	SCORE			
MALE FEM			CONUS OCNUS	SCORE	POPUL			
83	17	62	38	CH85	61			

MOS 55B

BACKGROUND

The significant increase in requirements for ammo specialists occur in FY86. This increase is caused by changes to both equipment and organizations.

SYSTEMS

This MOS will become the functional operators for the DAS 3 type A & B computer for the ammunition system until a new MOS (556) is approved.

ORGANIZATION

The set-up of the Divisional Ammo Transfer Points (ATP) in the 511 Battalion and the forward support Battalions also cause increased requirements.

TRAINING



The increase from FY83 to FY84 requirement consists of 701 1st term soldiers and will create significant impact to the tag base.

SUPPORTABILITY/CONCLUSIONS


Early training base anticipation of the FY84 requirement peak is needed to ensure supportability.

RECOMMENDATION

Revise DAS 3 distribution to provide smoother transition to increased requirement or provide FY84 reoccurring to.



63D SELF-PROPELLED FIELD ARTILLERY SYSTEM MECHANIC



MOS			ACCESSION			TRAINING		
FOR OPSTN	AUTH	FACES	EXIT SKILL	ED IN	UNSPEN FILL %	GAP	TIME WKS	LEAD MOS
			TTHS	ATTRITION		RETENTION		
				%	MISC %	REENTL MISC	IN MISC	SEE ABC
947	1040	93	19	5	10	44	73	0
1111	1040	93	115	110	101	69	69	74
111108	1137	190	235	231	224	294	294	154
111108	1506	559	690	694	702	1165	1165	708
TRADEOFFS			MOS PREREQ			SCORE		
MALE/FEMALE	CONUS/OCNUS	CONUS/OCNUS	MALE/FEMALE	CONUS/OCNUS	CONUS/OCNUS	MALE/FEMALE	CONUS/OCNUS	CONUS/OCNUS
100	0	48	52	100	21			

MOS 630

BACKGROUND - New MOS for maintaining SP FA equipment
MOS will be supported by reclassified 63C and 63F personnel
Initial 1st term reenlistment rates are low
Increase occurs as additional FA systems come into the divisions



SYSTEMS - All SP FA equipment

ORGANIZATIONS - All FA battalions



TRAINING - MOS has a 85% course completion rate

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS - MOS currently has 52% of personnel stationed overseas. Increased requirements could cause MOS to become SINGOS

RECOMMENDATION - The grade structure bottleneck at the E6 level must be eliminated. The fact that 450 feeds into this MOS at the E6 level compounds the problem. The reduction of 95 E6 positions in division 86 structure also adds to problem



67Y ATTACK HELICOPTER REPAIRER



MOS		ACCESSION			TRAINING		
67Y	CAP	CRIT	ED	INSPER	TIME	LEAD	
		DRILL	IRI	FILL %	WKS	MOS	
				101	12	28	
		ATTENTION			RETENTION		
67Y	CAP	TTHS	MISC	REENT	MIG	SAB	
		%	%	28	IN	ABC	
67Y	646	11	11	9	63	3	-
67Y	926	122	128	133	539	533	644
67Y	1042	250	257	263	870	860	387
67Y	1030	236	243	244	859	849	404

Note: See Summary Sheet

MOS 67Y

This MOS has experienced a 10 percent increase in authorizations from FY 78 (1726) to Oct 80 (1892) Army-wide. Future projection for the Navy Div's indicates a further increase of 396 spaces by FY 91. The strength deviation has been favorable until Apr 80. Currently, however, the MOS is experiencing a shortage in personnel Army-wide.



Perform maintenance on attack helicopters, excluding repair of systems components.

Organization, direct and general support (aviation unit, intermediate, and depot).


Course length is 12 weeks. Course attrition is 20%.

There is a dramatic drop in authorizations from skill level 2 (670) to skill level 3 (160). This promotion bottleneck is undoubtedly contributing to the poor retention of first term soldiers (282). At the same time that the strength deviation is on a downward trend, future requirements continue to increase (\$96 by FY 91 - Navy Div) making supportability doubtful.

None.



76V MATERIEL STORAGE AND HANDLING SPECIALIST



MOS			ACCESSION			TRAINING		
76V			EDY SKILL	ED INI	TIME FILL %	CAP	TIME WKS	LEAD MOS
					102		4	26
			ATTENTION			RETENTION		
OPSTN	AUTH	FACE	%	CRS %	MISC %	SEENL 100	MIG IN 2	SRD A B C
790	973	+183	0	2	9	75	47	3
1114	1377	+787	856	862	889	1527	1511	192
1225	1560	+770	837	843	869	1482	1466	190
1609	1813	+1023	1112	1120	1155	2002	1981	194
			TRADEOFFS					
			MALE/FEMALE	CONUS/OCONUS	MOS PREREQ			
			MALE FEM	CONUS OCONUS	SCORE POPUL			
81	19	60	40	CL90	56			

MOS 76V

BACKGROUND

MOS 76V increases 587 authorizations which is a 60% increase from current structure. E3-E6 increase through FY85
World-wide operating strength 84%
Div 86 operating strength 81%

SYSTEMS

NA

ORGANIZATIONS

NA

TRAINING



Course completion rate 82%
Training program fill 102%

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS

MOS appears marginal supportable.
The plus-up in Div 86 organization coupled with the current 76V personnel shortage makes this MOS one that must be carefully managed to insure that properly trained soldiers are in the field at the right time and place

RECOMMENDATIONS

NONE



GRADE FEASIBILITY

Year	Number of persons (in millions)
1981	8.5
1982	10.5
1983	20.0
1984	20.5
1985	20.5
1986	20.5
1987	20.5
1988	20.5
1989	20.5
1990	20.5
1991	20.5

MOS			ACCESSION			TRAINING		
91Y			ENIT	ED	TARGET	CAP	TIME	LEAD
			SKILL	INT	FILL %			
			-	-	90	-	19	30
TTMS			ATTENTION			RETENTION		
CNR OF STR	AUTH	FACES	%	COS	MISC	ACCENT	MIC	30S
				%	%	INITIAL	IN 2	A B C
4	7	+3	29	16	8	56	2 / 3	-
16"11"	20	+16	23	25	25	38	38	235 %
18"110"	20	+16	23	25	25	38	38	235 %
18"110"	20	+16	23	25	25	38	38	235 %

MALE/FEMALE		CONUS/CONUS		MOS/PRENEQ		TRADEOFFS	
MALE	FEM	CONUS	CONUS	SCORE	POPUL		
72	28	82	18	CT90	46		

MOS 91Y

BACKGROUND

MOS 91Y increases 13 authorizations as a result of Div 86. This is a 185% increase. Grade E3 increases 7 and E4 increases 6 spaces

Low density MOS

1st term and careerist retention rate 56/50 percent respectively

SYSTEMS

NA

ORGANIZATIONS

Current H-series TOE for Med Bn authorizes 1 E4 and 1 E3. 91Y may not have been documented due to more critical needs for another MOS

TRAINING

91Y has a 90% training fill with a 76% course retention

18 months minimum and 30 months maximum lead time to access and train.

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS

The long lead time access and train qualified 91Y in sufficient quantities makes this MOS marginally supportable in Div 86 organization.

RECOMMENDATION

Enhance recruiting and retention incentives through enlistment bonus and SSB entitlement

	E3	E4	E5	E6	E7	E8	E9
7							
6							
5							
4							
3							
2							
1							


GRADE CHANGES

E9	
E8	
E7	8 (8)
E6	14 (14)
E5	31 (31)
E4	120 (114)
E3	87 (80)

GRADE FEASIBILITY

MOS		ACCESSION			TRAINING			
98C		EXIT	ED	UNPREPARED	CAP	TIME WKS	LEAD MOS	
		SKILL	(IN)	FILL %				
		✓	2.5	51		up to 60	up to 40	
		TTTHS ATTRITION			RETENTION			
		FACES	CSG %	MISC %	REENTL MIG	MIG IN	OUT A/B/C	
108	312	+204	30	28	9	75 / 52	1 / 2	5 5 1
1111	420	+312	446	461	465	687	690	221 %
111111	442	+314	449	463	467	691	694	221 %
111111	240	+132	189	185	184	292	294	222 %

MALE/FEMALE		CONUS/OCONUS		MOS/PRIREQ		TRADEOFFS	
MALE	FEM	CONUS	OCONUS	SCORE	POPUL		
74	26	45	55	51105	16		



MDS 98C

BACKGROUND

Language MOS
 Difficult to support current "H" series TOE
 Ramp up of 110 to support ASAS
 79% strength world-wide
 62% strength 10 Navy Div
 26% Female
 Grade Infeasible E1-E4, E4-E5
 55% SIMOS

SYSTEMS

NI Bn (CEMI)

TRAINING



Very long - 16 - 58 weeks
 28% attrition
 30% TTMS

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS


Continuing recruiting shortfalls
 NFIP distribution priority detracts from CEMI fill, NFIP is filled first.
 With increasing NFIP authorizations, support to Div 86 infeasible

RECOMMENDATIONS

NFIP priority should be brought up as detractor to CEMI supportability
 Language CWP study if implemented may help alleviate problems in all Language MOS's



98G ELECTRONIC WARFARE/ SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE VOICE INTERCEPTOR



MOS		ACCESSION			TRAINING		
98G		ED	THORP	CAP	TIME	LEAD	
		IN	FILL %		WKS	MOS	
		-	2.34	97	60	60	
					60	60	
		ATTENTION			RETENTION		
		TTHS	MISC	REEL	MIG	IN	A B C
		%	%	%	%	%	%
191	456	44	15	49	61	1	5 2
1A-111	529	604	597	784	767	227	5
1A-1102	552	645	638	834	815	226	5
1A-1101	510	570	563	759	743	233	5

TRADEOFFS		MOS PREREQ	
		SCORE	POPUL
72	28	57	34

AD-A128 777

PERSONNEL SUPPORTABILITY ASSESSMENT HEAVY DIVISION 86
TRANSITION VOLUME I(U) ARMY SOLDIER SUPPORT
CENTER-NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION ALEXANDRIA VA 1981


2/3


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F/G 5/9


NL





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

986 ELECTRONIC WARFARE/ SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE VOICE INTERCEPTOR



MOS			ACCESSION			TRAINING		
986			CRIT SKILL	ED IN	THROPT FILL %	CAP	TIME WKS	LEAD MOS
			-	2.54	97		up to 60	up to 60
			ATTENTION			RETENTION		
SUB OPATH	AUTH	FACES	%	608 %	MISC %	REENT MIG	61 / 74	AB C
391	456	+265	44	35	11	49 / 74	61 / 74	5 5 2
10-87	529	+338	604	507	591	784	767	227 %
10-8100	552	+361	645	638	632	834	815	226 %
10-8100	510	+319	570	563	557	759	743	233 %
			CONUS/CONUS			TRADEOFFS		
MALE/FEMALE	CONUS/CONUS	MOS PREREQ						
MALE FEM	CONUS CONUS	SCORE POPUL						
72 28	43 57	5795 34						

MOS 98C

BACKGROUND - Current strength difficult to maintain

57X SIMOS

81X strength world-wide

41X strength 10 Hwy Div

Language MOS

SYSTEMS - TRAILBLAZER, TACJAH, QUICKFIX

ORGANIZATIONS - MI BN (CENT)

TRAINING - Long lng time - (5 - 50 weeks)

Language dependent

13X course attrition

44X TTNS - very high

SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS - NTIP priority severely impacts on this MOS


Doubtful it will support Div 86

With fielding of equipment to stateside units SIMOS problem may get better

RECOMMENDATION - NTIP priority should be brought up as detractor to CEM supportability

Language CNP proposal may help keep qualified linguists


If equipment is fielded to COMUS the SIMOS problem can be reduced



E0	(0)
E8	(20)
E7	(184)
E6	(521)
E5	(600)
E4	(760)
E3	(0)

GRADE FEASIBILITY

98J EW/SIGINT NONCOMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTOR



MOS		ACCESSION			TRAINING		
		ENIT	ES	THESPEL	CAP	TIME	LEAD
		SKILL	(BI)	FILL %		WKS	MOS
98J				99	✓	14	29
		ATTENTION			RETENTION		
		TTHS	%	GEN	REENT	WIC	ORR
		ADTH	FACES	%	WISC	IN	A B C
		OPATH			WISC	2/4	5 1
90	169		+79	20	25	0	11/70
1A*77	255		+165	207	199	199	722
1A*AL07	254		+164	205	198	198	708
1A*AL01	160		+250	313	309	1221	1226
		CONUS/OCONUS			TRADEOFFS		
		MALE/FEMALE	CONUS/OCONUS	MOS PREREQ			
		MALE FEM	CONUS OCONUS	SCORE POPUL			
45	78	55	45	51105			
				16			

MOS 9BJ

- BACKGROUND

 - Poor 1st term re-up rate 11%
 - USAIES shows a 4% decrease in requirements from current to Div 86
 - Computer run shows 66% increase. Again NFIP must be the difference
- SYSTEMS



 - TEAMPAX
 - ASAS
- ORGANIZATION

 - MI Bn (CEVI)
- TRAINING


 - Equipment constrained tng base
 - 20% TTMS
 - 24% course attrition
- SUPPORTABILITY CONCLUSIONS

 - Growing authorizations
 - Recruiting/retention problems
 - NFIP distribution priorities
 - Unable to meet current or Div 86 requirements
 - 4 year enlistment thus no bonus
 - If retention stays so low MOS will never get better
- RECOMMENDATION

 - Re-evaluate bonuses



98Z ELECTRONIC WARFARE/ SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE CHIEF



MOS		ACCESSION				TRAINING			
98Z		ENRIT	ED	UNUS/6M	CAP	TIME	LEAD	MOS	
		SKILL	INI	FILL %					
		TTYS		ATTENTION		RETENTION			
			CS	MISC	RECHL	MIG	2	1	
		FACES	%	%	100	100	100	100	
7	24	+17	13		96	10	1	1	
11-11-11	30	+23	26	26					
11-11-11	30	+23	26	26					
11-11-11	40	+33	26	26					

MALE/FEMALE		CONUS/OCONUS	MOS PREREQ	TRADEOFFS	
MALE	FEM	CONUS	OCONUS	SCORE	POPUL
100	0	62	38		

BACKGROUND

-

Copper MOS for QSD, H, K, 98C, E, J

62% strength world-wide

29% in 10 Evy Div

VM - SYSTEMS

ORGANIZATIONS



TRAINING

SUPPORTABILITY

- Feeder MOS low - may be a problem to fill

CONCLUSIONS

RECOMMENDATION - NONE



CONCLUSIONS

OPERATING STRENGTH VS MANNING OBJECTIVES

An operating strength to manning objectives comparison between unit operating strength and A-Series ALO 2 manning objectives indicates an increase of 11,850 spaces, or 7%, between FY81 and FY85; and 19,816 spaces or 12%, between FY81 and FY91.

AUTHORIZA- TIONS VS MANNING OBJECTIVES

A comparison of FY 81 MTOE authorizations and A-Series ALO 2 manning objectives indicates an increase of 11,235, also 7%, between FY81 and FY85; and 19,219 spaces, also 12%, between FY81 and FY91.

ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS

This total increase does not account for 2210 additional spaces identified in the J-Series DRAFT AURS for Tank Battalions and NBC Companies, and for 1458 additional spaces associated with the fielding of SOTAS, TEAMPACK, ASAS, TRAILBLAZER, QUICKFIX and REMBASS for which undocumented authorizations will impact on the CEWI Battalion. Addition of these spaces would increase the total manning objective to 23,484, 14%, between FY81 and FY91.

PROGRAM FORCE MANPOWER INCREASES

If current guidance regarding projected program force increases remains in effect, an increase of 5,235 spaces, or 3%, between FY81 and FY85; and 8,219 spaces, or 5% between FY81 and FY91 will be required to meet manning objectives. The affordability of the 10 Heavy Divisions rests largely on the manpower spaces which have yet to be allocated to meet the manning objectives of an already constrained ALO 2 Heavy Division 86 force.

OFFICER MANNING OBJECTIVES

Total officer manning objectives increase 2,423 spaces, or 24%, between FY81 and FY85; and 2,868 spaces, or 29%, between FY81 and FY91. This must be accommodated within a current operating strength shortfall of 488 officers, or 5%, in the present 10 Heavy Divisions. Increased manning objectives for Captains of 1073, or 28%, and for Majors of 439, or 31%, are most significant.

WARRANT
OFFICER
MANNING
OBJECTIVES

Total warrant officer manning objectives increase 665 spaces, or 28%, between FY 81 and FY 85; and 1004 spaces, or 42%, between FY 85 and FY 91. This must be accommodated within a current operating strength shortfall of 254 warrant officers, or 15% in the 10 Heavy Divisions. Increased manning objectives for 439 technical warrant officers, or 44% of the total increased, is particularly significant since they must be accessed from already constrained noncommissioned officer ranks.

ENLISTED
MANNING
OBJECTIVE

Total enlisted manning objective increase 8,762 spaces, or 6%, between FY81 and FY85; and 15,944 spaces or 11%, between FY81 and FY91. While the current enlisted operating strength exceeds current authorizations by 1204 soldiers, or 1%, in the 10 Heavy Divisions, most of this excess consists of entry level Privates. Serious noncommissioned officer shortages and MOS mismatch problems exist in the current heavy division force.

MAJOR
IMPACTS

The major manpower impact of manning objective increases will be felt in FY83 and FY84 as units begin conversion to interim Heavy Division 86 structures and initial equipment modernization. By FY84, total manning objectives will have increased 10,360, or 6%, which is 52% of the total Heavy Division increase and 95% of the total Heavy Division manning objectives. Thus, considering slightly decreased authorizations in FY82, over half the manpower cost of the ten year Heavy Division 86 transition occurs in FY83 and FY84 with the major portion in FY84.

SUPPORT-
ABILITY
PROBLEMS

A significant number of personnel supportability problems must be resolved to manage Heavy Division 86 transition properly. For near term increases, primarily in FY84, the FY84-88 Program Objective Memorandum must adequately identify resource requirements for accession, and training. Retention of critical skills must be enhanced to ensure a base of trained leaders and supervisors. Turbulence must be managed with consideration for unit readiness force modernization objectives and individual morale.

OFFICER
SUPPORT-
ABILITY
PROBLEMS

-38 officer SSI manning objectives increase in excess of 20%.
-33 SSI have a current operating strength below 90% in the 10 Heavy Divisions. Of these, 15 have an increasing manning objective in excess of 20%.
-5 specialties with increasing manning objectives are underlined.
-7 specialties with increasing manning objectives have continuation patterns below Army average.
-6 SSI, or 7% of the total and 18% where manning objectives are increasing are potentially not supportable.

WARRANT
OFFICER
SUPPORT-
ABILITY
PROBLEMS

-19 warrant officer MOS manning objectives increase in excess of 20%.
-18 MOS have a current operating strength below 90% in the 10 Heavy Divisions. Of these, 11 have an increasing manning objective in excess of 20%.
-4 MOS, or 11% of the total and 21% where manning objectives are increasing, are potentially not supportable.

ENLISTED
SUPPORT-
ABILITY
PROBLEMS

-87 Enlisted MOS manning objectives increase in excess of 20%.
-70 MOS have a current operating strength below 90% in the 10 Heavy Divisions. Of these, 29 have an increasing manning objective in excess of 20%.
-5 MOS with increasing manning objectives have been designated as critical accession skills.
-16 MOS with increasing manning objectives are currently SIMOS. 13 additional MOS are near SIMOS.
-8 MOS with increasing manning objectives and over 50% OCONUS deployed personnel have a female ratio in excess of 10%. Of these, 5 MOS have a female ratio in excess of 20%.
-11 MOS with increasing manning objectives have a training program fill below 95%.
-9 MOS with increasing manning objectives have a training capacity constraint.
-27 MOS with increasing requirements have a course attrition rate in excess of 20%. Of these, 11 are in excess of 40%.
-16 MOS with increasing manning objectives have a miscellaneous attrition during the first year of service in excess of 10%.
-17 MOS with increasing manning objectives have a combined first-term and career retention rate below 50%.
-8 MOS with increasing manning objectives have a high out migration ratio.
-33 MOS with increasing manning objectives have a declining ASVAB test score performance in 11 test areas in excess of 5% over a four year period.

- Numerous MOS have long training times resulting in high TTRS account ratios.
- Numerous MOS have grade infeasible structures compounded by Heavy Division 86 grade manning objectives.
- Numerous MOS have serious NCO shortages.
- 30 MOS or 13% of the total and 34% where manning objectives are increasing, are potentially not supportable.

MISSION
AREA
IMPACTS

The overall personnel supportability impact on each TRADOC Mission Area will affect the ability of the heavy divisions to transition as balanced, mission capable forces. Specific MOS/SSI supportability problems are discussed in detailed projections contained in VOL III (PROJECTIONS DATA). Potentially non supportable MOS/SSI are also detailed at the end of this section.

CLOSE
COMBAT
HEAVY

Specific MOS problems exist; however, all MOS/SSI appear to be supportable. A number of associated skills; however, have severe supportability problems. These include warrant officer MOS 27E - TOE/DRAGON Repairer, MOS 100B - Scout Helicopter Pilot, 45G - Fire Control Systems Repairer, 45T - ITV/IFV/CFV Turret Mechanic and 52C - Utility Equipment Repairer.

FIRE
SUPPORT
BATTLEFIELD
NUCLEAR
WARFARE

Numerous MOS associated with fielding of new Field Artillery Systems and increased authorizations due to 3x8 155mm SP battalion conversions are potentially not supportable. Additionally, the combined effects of system generated manning objective increases without identification of associated tradeoffs presents an overall supportability problem for the Fire Support Mission Area. MOS/SSI with severe supportability problems include 13E - Cannon FA Officer, 13M - MLRS Crewman, 13R - FA FIREFINDER Radar Operator, 13T - RPV Crewman, 13W - FA Target Acquisition Senior Sergeant, 13Y - Cannon/Missile Senior Sergeant, and 15D - MLRS Sergeant. MOS 93F - Meteorological Crewman, while documented as potentially not supportable in the A-Series AURS; is supportable in the J-Series DRAFT TOE. Additionally, an associated skill, MOS 63D - Self Propelled FA System Mechanic has severe supportability problems.

AIR DEFENSE

Overall the Air Defense mission area is supportable. Specific skills with severe supportability problems include 27N - FAAR Repairer and 27Z - AD Systems Maintenance Chief.

INTELLIGENCE/ The ability to provide adequate personnel support
ELECTRONIC for increased manning objectives associated with the
WARFARE CEWI Battalion and modernized EW/SIGNIT equipment
is doubtful. Priorities of the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP), undocumented MOS and
grade manning objectives for new systems causing
further increases in already constrained skills, and
long leadtimes required to recruit and train
linguists are major contributors to this problem.
Specific MOS/SSI with severe supportability problems
include SSI 35A - Tactical Intelligence Officer,
Warrant Officer, MOS 100B - Observation Helicopter
Pilot, 982A - Traffic Analysis Technician, and 983A -
Emanations Analysis Technician. Enlisted support-
ability problems occur in MOS 33S - EW/Intercept
Systems Repairer, 17M - Remote Sensor Operator,
05D - EW/SIGINT Emitter Identifier/Locator, and
EW/SIGINT Morse Interceptor, 98C - EW/SIGINT Analyst,
98G - EW/SIGINT Non-Communications Intercept and
98Z - EW/SIGINT Chief.

MOBILITY/ Overall, this mission area appears supportable.
COUNTER- These are no MOS/SSI that have been identified as
MOBILITY/ potentially not supportable; however, MOS 52C
MINE WARFARE discussed earlier under Close Combat is an Engineer
associated skill that will impact this mission area
primarily for training support of a doubling popu-
lation in the heavy divisions between FY82 and FY84.
Additionally, MOS decisions affecting the M9 ACE will
have to be closely monitored for supportability
impact.

COMMUNI- Overall two specific MOS 31S - Field
CATIONS General COMSEC Repairer and 31T - Field
Systems COMSEC Repairer have been identified
as non-supportable. The tremendous impact
of over 200 new signal systems entering the
force, many with undocumented personnel
impacts; however, will cause potential
problems in training and field operations.

COMMAND & Overall supportability is not a problem. Increasing
CONTROL reliance on C2 systems, such as numerous communi-
cations and computer items; however, will require
close monitoring of this mission area as one
operationally dependent on other mission areas for
its effectiveness.

COMBAT
SERVICE
SUPPORT

Supportability problems exist in selected Medical, Ordnance, Missile and Munitions, Transportation and Quartermaster MOS/SSI. MOS 35U - Biomedical Equipment Specialist (Advanced) and 91Y - Eye Specialist are potentially non supportable Medical MOS. SSI 91A - Maintenance Management Officer and 91B - Armament/Mechanized Maintenance Officer, Warrant Officer MOS 630A - Automotive Repair Technician and MOS 55B - Ammunition Specialist are Ordnance/Missile and Munitions MOS/SSI that are potentially non supportable in addition to 45G, 45T, 52C and 63D already discussed. MOS 67Y - Attack Helicopter Repairer is a potentially non supportable Transportation MOS. SSI- 92A - Supply & Services Management Officer and 92B - Materiel Management Officer, and MOS 76V - Materiel Storage and Handling Specialist are potentially non supportable Quartermaster MOS/SSI. Overall, CSS mission area impacts are difficult to assess due to the lack of documentation and transition guidance for MOS and grade requirements in the non-divisional support elements. Of particular concern will be those critical skills required for DS/GS and GS maintenance of new systems and critical skills required to provide battle support functions at corps and echelons above corps.

AVIATION

Overall, the Aviation mission area is supportable. MOS 100B and 67Y discussed earlier, however, are potentially non supportable Aviation associated skills.

NUCLEAR/
BIOLOGICAL/
CHEMICAL

Personnel Supportability of the divisional NBC Company is difficult due to potentially non supportable chemical MOS. These include MOS 54E - NBC Specialist and 54Z - Chemical Senior Sergeant. While reclassification actions and grade substitution may provide some relief, additional requirements not identified in the J-Series DRAFT IOE but documented in the A-Series AURS will further compound problems associated with personnel support of the NBC Company.

HEAVY
DIVISION 86
SUPPORT-
ABILITY

As a total system, transition to Heavy Division 86 is potentially not supportable. This is due primarily to uncertain future manpower constraints, the near term impact of major personnel manning objectives increases in FY84, and the problems with selected skills which impact most heavily on the supportability of the Division Artillery, the CEWI Battalion and the Division Chemical Company and on materiel systems maintenance support. This conclusion is made based on present policies, programs, documentation, transition guidance and known manpower constraints.

A concerted effort to correct personnel and training problem areas associated with Heavy Division Transition, in conjunction with other Army 90's programs and the materiel impacts of force modernization can make the difference. This can only be done if transition to Heavy Division 86 is managed as a total, integrated effort, if the impact of a change in any part is recognized for its effect on soldiers and its potential effectiveness through the availability and skilled performance of those soldiers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

ADEQUATE MANPOWER

Army 90's transition is a threat generated force modernization effort of unprecedented scope and complexity. Assurance of adequate manpower to field and sustain Army 90's program structures, beginning with a definition by the DCSOPS of authorizational levels for the 10 heavy divisions between FY84 and FY88, is essential for mission accomplishment. MACOMS can then document skill and grade authorizations to support transition requirements.

ADEQUATE ATTENTION

Strategic long range personnel planning is needed in conjunction with an Integrated systems support approach by those most closely associated with the management and leadership of the force modernization effort. The force structure, materiel and doctrine players must pay attention to personnel, training and logistical supportability as "go-no go" variables in everything they plan to do or to have others do. The personnel and training communities should continue and expand efforts to get out in front of the problem.

ADEQUATE FACES

Specific Recommendations by MOS/SSI are included in Vol III (PROJECTIONS DATA). Recommendations for management of TRADOC Mission Area Impacts are as follows:

CLOSE COMBAT HEAVY

Overall Manning Objectives increases of 425 officers and decreases of 5939 enlisted personnel present no supportability problem. Associated support skill; however, continue to present supportability problems.

- Expand training capacity and provide recruiting and retention incentives for MOS 27E, 45G, 45T and 52C.
- Retain FY82 45T spaces to cover ramp up in FY85-91 requirements.
- Stretch out E-Date conversion MTOE documentation of 27E, 45G, 45T and 52C spaces within units for which equipment conversion to MI, IFV and CFV has not occurred.
- Provide close monitoring of SSI 12A captain distribution.
- Provide for early procurement of MOS 100B Warrant Officers and provide retention incentives for improved MOS 100 series skills.

FIRE SUPPORT/ BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WARFARE

Overall Manning Objectives increases of 637 officers, 52 warrant officers and 6,869 enlisted personnel severely impacts personnel supportability of the Heavy Division 86 Division Artillery. These increases are particularly severe between FY83 and FY85.

- Manage SSI 13E by exception. This may include faster promotion to O3, increased FY83-85 accessioning, limited active duty tours for RC Captains, grade substitution and requirements screening for validity of nonunit distribution.
- Provide retention incentives for MOS 13Y, 13W, 15D and 13B40 grade E7. Provide retention incentives for feeder MOS to these critical skills.

- Extend deployment schedule for RPV, Q-36 and Q-37 Radars to provide smoother requirements ramp-up for MOS 13T and 13R.
- Extend the current 3 x 3 conversion program beyond FY85.
- Provide recruiting incentives for MOS 13M, 13R and 13T.

AIR
DEFENSE

Overall Manning Objectives increases of 54 officers, 46 Warrant Officers and 2,285 enlisted personnel have been well managed by trade-offs from other Air Defense programs. Supportability should be no problem; however, retention of critical NCO skills must be addressed, particularly for MOS 16Z and 27Z grade E8.

INTELLIGENCE/
ELECTRONIC
WARFARE

Overall Manning Objectives increases of 324 officers, 44 warrant officers and 687 enlisted personnel will be difficult to support for the CEWI Battalions, particularly due to requirements for shortage skills.

- Increase assessments for SSI 35A.
- Establish enlistment bonus for MOS 98J.
- Expand training capacity for MOS 33S, 98J, 05G and 05D.
- Reduce course attrition in critical technical and language skills.
- Streamline security clearance process. Currently a BI takes up to one year to complete. Prioritize process for critical skills.
- Reevaluate and seek DOD support for revision or redirection of NFIP priorities. A tactical intelligence structure is not supportable under current policies and programs.
- Explore alternative personnel sources such as lateral entry, civilianized NFIP positions and increased specialization towards reducing shortage skill requirements.
- 982A and 983A warrant officers procurement alternatives should be explored.

MOBILITY/
COUNTERMO-
BILITY/
MINE WARFARE

Overall Manning Objectives increases of 129 officers, 44 warrant officers and 233 enlisted personnel should present no supportability problem.

- Monitor MOS requirement for the M9 ACE to assess supportability impacts of alternative MOS decision options.

COMMUNICA-
TIONS

Overall Manning Objectives increases of 124 officers, 22 warrant officers and 495 enlisted personnel should be supportable.

- Monitor impacts of new system fielding to insure continued personnel and training supportability.
- Review SGA for MOS 31S grade E6 and 31T grade E4.
- Reduce training shortfall in MOS 31T.

COMBAT
SERVICE
SUPPORT

Overall Manning Objectives increases of 790 officers, 186 warrant officers and 9,122 enlisted personnel may create a supportability problem. This can not be determined until other Army 90's programs, particularly Heavy Corps 86 and EAC 86, are documented and trade-offs can be assessed.

- Implement combat arms detail to improve assessment of SC 91 and 92.
- Determine changes in procurement methodology for MOS 630A.
- Review SGA for MOS 35U and consider redocumenting to E5 positions, MOS 35G.

- Revise DAS 3 distribution to stretch out FY84 requirements ramp up for MOS 55B or document alternative MOS 55R for DAS 3 Ammunition System.
- Closely monitor MOS 76V to insure priority fill.
- Enhance MOS 91Y recruiting and retention by establishing enlistment bonus and SRB.
- Implement recommendation for MOS 27E, 45G, 45T and 52C discussed earlier under ADA and Close Combat.
- Retain current MOS 63D requirements to smooth out ramp up in FY86. Review SGA to eliminate grade structure bottleneck at E6 compounded by 45D feeder MOS.
- Coordinate with OTSG to insure SSI 60-68 medical officer increases are programmed to meet Heavy Division 86 Manning Objectives.
- Establish Zones SRB to insure improved first term retention for MOS 67Y.

AVIATION

Overall increases of 243 officers, 593 warrant officers and 966 enlisted personnel are supportable.

- MOS 100B and MOS 67Y discussed earlier must be closely monitored to support increased Aviation requirements.
- The CMF 67 study should resolve Aviation grade feasibility issues. Closely monitor to insure implementation.
- The feasibility of establishing an Aviation Branch for SC 15, with inherent OBC and OAC professional development training should continue to be investigated. Diverse interests in Aviation officer management compound inconsistent policies in development and utilization of commissioned aviators.

CHEMICAL

Overall increases of 133 officers and 1281 enlisted personnel will create severe supportability problems for the NBC company.

- MOS 54E structure must be revised to alleviate grade infeasible structure to E5.
- Stretch out requirements for MOS 54Z to smooth out FY84 ramp up.

TRANSITION GUIDANCE

Single E date conversions should require detailed MOS and grade MTOE documentation to insure authorizations reflect only mission essential increases in critical skills based on equipment conversion dates. This may reduce the impact of near term MOS supportability problems and allow the training base to graduate its resource requirements to meet training objectives. Equipment paced conversion of MOS and grade changes will improve skill match provided that distribution plans are known with sufficient lead time for detailed documentation of authorized personnel resources.

THE PERSONNEL COMMUNITY

Intensive management of accession, retention and attrition of personnel assets in close coordination with the training community is required. Reliance on current PPBS driven personnel authorization documents will not suffice in the near-term due

to insufficient lead time provided for manning objectives and resourcing to get the right soldier to the right unit on time.

- Establish an annual Force Modernization ARPRINT with current data base on latest ODCSOPS approved force structure and transition guidance.

- Identify Heavy Division 86 potential problem MOS's and USAREC critical skills, particularly in the areas of field Artillery, Intelligence/Electronic Warfare, chemical and maintenance MOS.

- Provide special incentives for recruitment and retention of equipment driven problem MOS/SSI.

- Define assessment objectives for MOS/SSI based on identification of force modernization manning objectives.

- Support the training community in eliminating "hard" constraints to training capacity, particularly for field artillery Intelligence/Electronic Warfare MOS.

- Orient the warrant officer recruiting and voluntary recall programs on Army 86 critical requirements.

- Incorporate Army 90's required increases in the DAMPL with high priority for distribution toward Army 90's critical skills.

- Reorient resource priorities to insure adequate support for Army 90's transitioning, particularly for Heavy Division 86. This includes training base expansion, DAMPL distribution priorities and end strength increases. With ODCSOPS identify the "requirements to authorizations gap" by fiscal year.

- Insure that Army 90's transition receives priority for distribution and assignment of critical personnel assets.

- With ODCSOPS, coordinate and identify Life Cycle Personnel requirements for Integrated System Support (ISS) of new materiel systems.

- With ODCSOPS, coordinate personnel implications of High-Low mix unit alternatives within each level of unit structure.

THE TRAINING COMMUNITY

Documentation of training base resource requirements to support Heavy Division 86 transition is absolutely essential in the FY84-88 POM. Later adjustments, while necessary, must be kept to "fine tuning" as much as possible to minimize turbulence. Additionally, the following measures should be instituted.

- Review course POI to shorten course length of critical specialties where course attrition is not a problem.

- In coordination with DCSPER, streamline security clearance requirements and procedures, particularly for Intelligence/Electronic Warfare and Field Artillery Nuclear Surety associated specialties.

- Reduce course attrition rates in critical specialties. Review MOS prerequisites, selection procedures, training plan content and training methods. Lengthen courses where required.

- Insure maximum training capacity is attained consistently to provide optimum training program fill in critical specialties

- Reduce TTHS accounts through increased OSUT and shorter course lengths where practicable.

- Complete documentation of final BOIP/QQPRI personnel requirements for TACJAM, TEAMPACK, SOTAS, TRAFFICJAM, QUICKFIZ II, SLUFAC, ACE and GEMSS.
- Insure personnel community representation on New Organization Training and New Equipment Training Teams.

MACOMS

- Document FY84-88 PARR submissions to identify personnel authorizations required to support Heavy Division 86 transition as shown below. While direct equipment and structure related costs should be identified in the MRIS as stated above, other costs associated with organization and stationing should also be identified. Unit projections data for each of the 10 Heavy Divisions contained in Vol V, (Division Requirements) should assist in this effort.

Document Modernization Requirements Information Submission (MRIS) equipment driven training base personnel increases to support the 10 Heavy Divisions as follows:

<u>PROPONENT</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>
CM	NBC Company	- XM14. 9 per company to MRIS. 6 per company to Army 90
EN	Engineer Battalion	- ACE - GEMSS - SLUFAC
FA	HHB, Division Artillery	- FAMAS - PADS
FA	FA Target Acquisition Battalion	- AN/TPQ-36 - AN/TPQ-37 - RPV
SI	Signal Battalion	- PLRS and TACSATCOM H-series to MRIS. J-series increases to Army 90.
AR	Tank Battalion	- M1 Tank
LOGCEN	DMMC	- Ancillary support Systems (trucks, POL tankers, etc., due to increases of M1, IFV, CFV).
OD	Maintenance Battalion	- Tools test sets, test equipment and personnel to support M1, IFV, CFV and system changes

IT	CEWI Battalion	- TACJAM, TEAMPACK, SOTAS, TRAFFICJAM and QUICKFIX II H-series to MRIS. J-series to Army 90.
FA	8"/MLRS Battalion	- MLRS

MRIS related conversion dates are contained, by division and UIC in Vol IV,
(Assumptions (S) and Conversion Schedule (C)) of this assessment.


METHODOLOGY

BACKGROUND

The TRADOC Army 86 Studies that began in 1976 culminated on 1 August 1980 with a decision briefing to the Chief of Staff of the Army by the TRADOC Commander. Transition planning was then begun by the Army Staff. On 30 October 1980, DCSPER requested that TRADOC assist the Army staff in this effort through conduct of a Personnel supportability analysis and development of projections data. This analysis was completed on 12 March 1981 based on beginning-end and over-time comparisons of the current 10 Heavy Divisions (H-Series MTOE) with a model projection of the future 10 Heavy Division 86 force structure (Y-Series AURS). DCSOPS approved transition guidance as of 30 January 1981 was used to program force structure and equipment transition assumptions. Headquarters TRADOC subsequently directed that an assessment of the 10 Heavy Divisions be made using interim structures (A-SERIES AURS).

APPROACH

The approach used to develop the Division 86 Data Base was the Functional Review methodology as shown below:



BASE FILE	Officer, Warrant Officer and Enlisted operating strengths were obtained from the MILPERCEN Enlisted and Officer Master Files as of end-June 1981.
DETAIL FILE	Current H-Series Heavy Division TOE/MTOE organization detail was obtained from the MILPERCEN Authorizations Data Base (AUDB), derived from the July 1981 PERSACS, for unit documents in the force for the period starting 30 September 1981. Heavy Division 86 transition organization detail was obtained from the 29 July 1981 Update TOE TAPE containing the A-Series AURS. Impacts of selected systems, DAS 3, RPV, DIVAD, 3x8 DS Artillery conversion, MLRS and MAB to Ribbon Brigade conversion, were entered in the detail file based on draft Basis of Issue Plans or full modernization transition guidance provided by appropriate TRADOC combat developments activities.
TRANSACTIONS FILE	Unit header records were obtained from the MILPERCEN AUDB covering the same period as the unit detail file. Program, deployment, activation, inactivation and concepts transactions were obtained from the FY83-87 Program Objective Memorandum 15 June 1981, the Army 90's Transition Guidance 28 July 1981, Total Army Analysis 88 Heavy Division Conversion Schedule 19 August 1981, DCSOPS Equipment Distribution Plans as of 30 August 1981, and the August 1981 M-Force.
TRANSITION GUIDANCE & ASSUMPTIONS	Transition guidance and assumptions used to program the Heavy Division Data Base are contained in VOL IV (CONVERSION SCHEDULE and ASSUMPTIONS). Emphasis was placed on production of a data base that could provide data to influence resource Heavy Division 86 requirements projections in the FY84-88 POM cycle and beyond. Current projections using PPBS generated documents failed to provide adequate transition data in sufficient time to produce this result.

REQUIREMENTS DATA

The requirements analysis focused on the manning objectives to field the Heavy Division 86 interim organizations, accounting for both structure and equipment modernization changes. This was reflected in MOS/SC and grade data on actual personnel required to field the Heavy Division 86 organizations, expressed as a total personnel manning objective for current and transition strength over time from FY81 to FY91. Two other comparisons were also computed. These included the differences, or delta, between current authorizations and future requirements and between current operating strength and future requirements. These were matched against the Y-Series AURS manned at ALO 1 for comparative purposes. This is illustrated below:

PREPARED ON 30 SEP 81
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(RIGHTS ARE AS OF END OF FY)

UNCLASSIFIED

PERSONNEL RESOURCE ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE
US ARMY SOLDIER SUPPORT CENTER - NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
HEAVY DIVISION 86 DATA BASE EXTRACT
REQUIREMENTS OVER TIME - ENLISTED

FOR SFC PARKINSON
PM# 325-8631/8779

ELE NAME IS FR86-RPT-ENL

MOS	GRADE	OPSTR	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY90	FY91	Y-ALO1
11M	E7	0			39	65	104	130	234	312	390	468	546	
	RO DELTA			+0	+39	+65	+104	+130	+234	+312	+390	+468	+546	+0
	OP DELTA		+0	+0	+39	+65	+104	+130	+234	+312	+390	+468	+546	+0
	E8	0			108	180	288	360	648	900	1116	1332	1584	
	RO DELTA			+0	+108	+180	+288	+360	+648	+900	+1116	+1332	+1584	+0
	OP DELTA		+0	+0	+108	+180	+288	+360	+648	+900	+1116	+1332	+1584	+0
	E5	0			276	460	726	920	1656	2208	2760	3312	3864	
	RO DELTA			+0	+276	+460	+726	+920	+1656	+2208	+2760	+3312	+3864	+0
	OP DELTA		+0	+0	+276	+460	+726	+920	+1656	+2208	+2760	+3312	+3864	+0
	E4	0			621	1035	1656	2070	3726	4968	6210	7452	8694	
	RO DELTA			+0	+621	+1035	+1656	+2070	+3726	+4968	+6210	+7452	+8694	+0
	OP DELTA		+0	+0	+621	+1035	+1656	+2070	+3726	+4968	+6210	+7452	+8694	+0
	E3	0			191	293	442	542	942	1263	1563	1863	2184	
	RO DELTA			+0	+191	+293	+442	+542	+942	+1263	+1563	+1863	+2184	+0
	OP DELTA		+0	+0	+191	+293	+442	+542	+942	+1263	+1563	+1863	+2184	+0
	MOS TOTALS	0			1235	2033	3226	4022	7206	9651	12039	14427	16872	
	RO DELTA			+0	+1235	+2033	+3226	+4022	+7206	+9651	+12039	+14427	+16872	+0
	OP DELTA		+0	+0	+1235	+2033	+3226	+4022	+7206	+9651	+12039	+14427	+16872	+0

(OP DELTA = END FY RIGHTS MINUS END FY81 RIGHTS)

UNCLASSIFIED


(OP DELTA = END FY RIGHTS MINUS OPSTR)

This format was used to produce the data contained in VOL II (REQUIREMENTS DATA). It identifies the relationships between current operating strength, current authorizations and current requirements to projected requirements over time. Projections incorporate conversion to interim organizational structures and new equipment in accordance with approved transition guidance.

MOS PROJECTIONS

Each Officer Specialty and Warrant Officer and Enlisted MOS was projected for impact on Heavy Division 86 transition. Data contained in various standard reports was collected to provide a current profile. This data was then combined with requirements data to develop projections of supportability by the personnel and training community. MOS projections are contained in VOL III (PROJECTIONS DATA), and grouped by TRADOC Mission Area. This is illustrated below:


11M FIGHTING VEHICLE INFANTRYMAN



MOS			ACCESSION			TRAINING		
			GRIT SKILL	ED 101	THP/PM FILL %	CAP	TIME WKS	LEAD MOS
11M					0		12 (0)	26
			TTHS			RETENTION		
CUB OP STN	ANTH	FACES	%	CAS %	MISC %	BEERL 100% CAP	MIG 100% CAP	SRB A B C
0	0	0	9	7	10	66 / 59	1 / 5	2 / 2 / 0
1A "T"	3226	~3226	3545	3579	3628	5215	5344	167 %
1A "ALB2"	16872	~16872	18541	18705	18948	26440	27115	161 %
1B "ALB1"	0							%
MALE/FEMALE		CONUS/OCONUS		MOS PREREQ		TRADEOFFS		
MALE	FEM	CONUS	OCONUS	SCORE	POPUL	11M's reclassified as 11M's during fielding of IFV		
100	0	0	100	0085	33			

MOS 11M

- BACKGROUND - New MOS. Initially, most of the support will come from those personnel and positions currently in MOS 11B. Personnel reclassified upon successful completion of new equipment training on the IFV. There should be an ample supply of 11B's for conversion due to squad size reduction from 11 to 9 men.
- SYSTEMS - IFV
M242 25mm Chain Gun
M247C 7.62mm Coaxial Machine Gun
Dual-Tube Tow Missile Launcher
- ORGANIZATIONS - Mech Bns have 4 rifle companies and an Anti-Armor Co. vs 3 Rifle and CS Co. Weapons platoon is eliminated from each Rifle Co.
- TRAINING - Majority of training will be accomplished by NET Teams as the IFV is fielded.
Poor grade feasibility from E3-E4
Out migration may not be a problem since figures for 11B were used
- RECOMMENDATION - Fielding plans need to be closely monitored to ensure MOS does not become imbalanced between CONUS and OCONUS



These projections provided an MOS/SC support-ability conclusion and, where appropriate, recommendations for resolution of specific supportability problems.

2024 DATA

Unit requirements data was also developed for total unit impact of Heavy Division 86 transition by both MOS and by unit. MOS unit impact data is contained in VOL V, Section 1 (UNIT MOS REQUIREMENTS). This data is presented in a format as illustrated below:

[illegible]

Divisional impacts on each of the 10 Heavy Divisions were also developed by unit, MOS and grade. These are contained in VOL V, Section 1 (DIVISION PROJECTIONS) with an annex devoted to each of the 10 Heavy Divisions. This data is presented in a format as illustrated below:

[illegible]

J-Series
AURS
COMPARISON

As the Heavy Division 86 force structure evolves toward standard TOE documentation, the J-Series AURS organizational structures are emerging to present an updated picture of divisional end-state. It is important, therefore, to capture the differences between A-Series and J-Series documents. This is contained in VOL VI (J-Series Comparison)

MRIS DATA

The Heavy Division 86 is a complex organization, driven by doctrinal, organizational and equipment changes. Separating out equipment and structure driven changes to meet Modernization Requirements Information Submission (MRIS) report formats was not performed in this assessment. This utility in projecting load driven equipment based training requirements will have to be determined by each user of this assessment.

TRAINING
DATA

The assessment can serve as a basis for projections of total training requirements for Heavy Division 86 transition. These requirements must account for changing personnel and training factors such as course attrition and retention rates.

MOS MATRIX USERS GUIDE

HOW TO USE THIS DOCUMENT The MOS MATRIX was designed to portray the current status of each Enlisted MOS associated with Heavy Division 86 known transition requirements. In some cases, MOS's were identified within current Heavy Division operating strengths for which a requirement no longer exists. These were deleted from the MATRIX.

DATA DISPLAY The data displayed for each MOS highlights the current operational, accession, training, retention, and proponenty data relevant to analysis of the MOS in light of changing requirements to support Heavy Division 86 transition. Observation of the relationships between data elements provided a basis for investigation of potential problem areas. This resulted in a detailed MOS Projection for each enlisted MOS. These are contained in VOL III (DETAILED PROJECTIONS), which are displayed by TRADOC mission area and cross indexed by MOS proponent and functional area. Officer and Warrant Officer projections are also contained in VOL III.

DATA SOURCES MOS data used in the MATRIX was drawn from the following sources:

<u>DATA ELEMENT</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>DATE</u>
MOS/Grades	Hv Div 86 Data Base	24 Sep 81
CMF/MOS Title/ Substitute MOS	AR 611-210 W/C-16	1 Sep 81
Current Oper Str/ World Wide Oper Str/ % Authorizations	MILPERCEN Enlisted Str Inventory (COPD 45 - Part 6)	31 Jul 81
Proponent/Remarks	AR 600-101 (Draft)	
CONUS-OCNUS Ratio	MILPERCEN Rotation Base Report (DAPC-236)	31 Jul 81
MOS Prerequisite/ % Population	DMDC Data Base FY77-80	Oct 81
Critical Skill	USAREC Hit List	30 Aug 81
Training Fill	MILPERCEN Yearly Limit Program (A PRO)	31 Jul 81
Training Capacity	DCSOPS Training Capacity Constraint Report (DAMO-TRI)	30 Jun 81
Training Time	MILPERCEN Qualifications File	Aug 81
Recruiting Lead Time	SSC-NCR BOIP Analysis	
Course Attrition	MILPERCEN PIA Report (ATSCHL)	Jul 81
Misc Attrition	MILPERCEN AID-E Report	Dec 80
1st Term Retention (3 yr)/Career Retention	DA MOS Retention Rates Report (COPD 70)	30 Jun 81
1st Term Retention (4 yr)/Career Retention	DA Report of Separations Eligible - 12 months (DAPC-120)	30 Jun 81

DATA ELEMENT Relationships between data elements can raise questions for further investigation. This can be useful for personnel managers, combat and training developers, policy analysts, program managers, training managers, operators, decision makers and unit leaders. They can provide a total systems oriented approach to policies, programs and actions affecting problems within these MOS's. Examples of data element relationships include:

- Operating strength to increased requirements.
- High THS to course length.
- Substitute MOS to increased requirements
- CONUS/OCONUS ratio to retention.
- CONUS/OCONUS ratio to male/female ratio
- Proponent to functional area concern
- MOS prerequisite to course attrition
- MOS prerequisite to population change
- Critical skill to increased requirements
- Enlistment option/bonus to increased requirements
- Training fill to increased requirements
- Training capacity to increased requirements
- Recruiting Lead Time to MOS decision
- Course attrition change to MOS prerequisite, course length, course content and training methodology.
- Miscellaneous attrition to unit training, facilities and command climate
- Retention to SRB
- Migration to promotion opportunity/grade feasibility

PROJECTING
MOS HEALTH

Objectively, these relationships must be evaluated for cause and effect across functional boundaries. As new data is generated from periodic reports, trends can begin to emerge to further refine problem area identification. This, in turn, can provide a more systematic approach to personnel and training plans, policies and operations for projective analysis and design of integrated "get well" strategies for problem MOS's.

AUTOMATION
OF MOS DATA

Efforts are under way to design and build compilations of MOS data, such as those contained in this MATRIX for automated update and access. Current standard automated reports are used primarily for discrete management functions and are thus not readily useable or accessible to many potentially interested parties. With the accelerated pace of change and the redefinition of proponentcy roles and proponent functions, a roll-up of relevant data appears to be increasingly needed.

P.N.	Title	GRADE	CURRENT OF 1916	NO. OF ADV.	FUND	MONTHLY PAY	CONTRIBUTION RATIO	CONTRIBUTION RATIO	RAIL/RAIL RATIO	BUSINESS		RECEIVING		TENDING		TIME LIMIT	ATTENTION		BUILDING		SERVICES	
										UNIT	PERCENT	UNIT	PERCENT	UNIT	PERCENT		UNIT	PERCENT	UNIT	PERCENT		UNIT
001	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
002	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
003	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
004	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
005	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
006	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
007	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
008	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
009	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
010	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
011	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
012	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
013	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
014	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
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016	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
017	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
018	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
019	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
020	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
021	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0	99	1	100	0	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	USAM
022	SP 2077 ASSIGNED	17	350	100	0																	

[illegible]

[illegible]

ROW	TITLE	ROW	CREDIT	OP/ADJ	TIME	LOCATION	CROSS CORREL		MALE/FEMALE		BBS		ACCESSION		TRAINING		ATTENTION		SYNOPSIS		REMARKS
							COIN	RECORD	MALE	FEMALE	COIN	RECORD	COIN	RECORD	COIN	RECORD	COIN	RECORD	COIN	RECORD	
62R	CONST EQ SUPV	51	EG-7	99	5	---	70	30	100	1	EA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK-1A
63B	LT BENCH/PM GEN REC	63	EG-8	102	15	---	53	47	96	1	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63D	SP FA SYS MECH	63	EG-8	1519	8	---	48	52	100	1	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63E	PL TANK SYS MECH	63	EG-7	127	99	22	95	7	99	1	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63F	FUEL & ELEC SYS REP	63	EG-5	401	111	15	48	51	92	0	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63G	TRACE VEH REP	63	EG-7	4676	87	7	55	45	96	1	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63H	ON O CHN EQ REP	63	EG-6	1005	112	6	53	47	92	0	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63I	PMO TANK SYS REP	63	EG-6	3388	95	8	56	44	100	1	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63J	WHEEL VEH REC	63	EG-5	1166	153	4	45	55	97	3	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63K	FVS SYS MECH	63	EG-5	3331	74	15	42	58	100	1	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63L	WHEEL VEH REP	63	EG-5	3381	99	12	45	55	95	5	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63M	TRACE VEH REC	63	EG-5	1405	111	8	55	45	99	1	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63N	PLCH PAINT SUPV	63	EG-8	593	84	6	57	43	100	1	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63O	MOTOR TRANS OP	63	EG-7	20315	104	12	56	44	91	9	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63P	TRANS SR SET	63	EG-8	591	124	6	56	44	100	0	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63Q	UTILITY MEL REP	63	EG-6	4573	102	10	54	46	96	1	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63R	TAC TRANS MEL REP	63	EG-6	310	95	23	52	48	97	3	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63S	ONB/SCOUT MEL REP	63	EG-6	2615	123	8	57	43	98	2	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63T	ATTACK MEL REP	63	EG-6	2059	116	31	60	40	99	1	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63U	ACFT PAINT SR SET	63	EG-8	1361	96	5	69	31	100	0	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63V	ACFT POWERPLANT REP	63	EG-6	764	110	8	57	43	98	2	OU	PM95	21	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	AK
63W	ACFT POWERTRAIN REP	63	EG-6	994	99	15	58	42	97												

[illegible]

HEAVY DIVISION 86

REMARKS


A-SERIES

ARMOR MECH

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AL02: 18676 19011

TRAN: 17467 17889




CURRENT DIVISION

REMARKS

H-SERIES

ARMOR MECH


AL01: 18776 19054



HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

DIVISION

HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS

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(ARMOR)

AL01: 200

AL02: 184

TRAN: 184

SRC: 87-004A120
(MECH)

AL01: 199

AL02: 183


TRAN: 183

DOTTED LINES ARE
NOT INCLUDED IN
TOTALS

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

DIVISION

CURRENT DIVISION



REMARKS

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(ARMOR)

AL01: 188


AL02: 177

SRC: 37-004H000
(MECH)

AL01: 191

AL02: 181

MILITARY POLICE COMPANY **HEAVY DIVISION 86**



REMARKS

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AL01: 119

AL02: 110


TRAN: 110

A-SERIES

SAME AS ABOVE

MILITARY POLICE COMPANY

CURRENT DIVISION



REMARKS


SRC: 19-017H710

AL01: 207

AL02: 185

SIGNAL BATTALION

HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS

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
AL01: 572

AL02: 522

TRAN: 522

SIGNAL BATTALION

CURRENT DIVISION



REMARKS


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AL01: 702

AL02: 654

AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY BATTALION

HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS

SRC: 44-275J100

AL01: 924

AL02: 886

TRAN: 804

SRC: 44-275A100


AL01: 965

AL02: 894

TRAN: 817

AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY BATTALION

CURRENT DIVISION



REMARKS


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AL01: 826

AL02: 788

ENGINEER BATTALION

HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS

SRC: 05-145A110
(MAB)

AL01: 974

AL02: 919

TRAN: 837

SRC: 05-145A140
(RIB)


AL01: 980

AL02: 919

TRAN: 837

ENGINEER BATTALION

CURRENT DIVISION



REMARKS

SRC: 05-145H710

(MAB)

AL01: 935

AL02: 847

SRC: 05-145H730

(RIB)

AL01: 939

AL02: 846

COMBAT ELECTRONIC WARFARE INTELLIGENCE BATTALION

HEAVY DIVISION 86


REMARKS

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AL01: 582


AL02: 528

TRAN: 537



COMBAT ELECTRONIC WARFARE INTELLIGENCE BATTALION

CURRENT DIVISION



REMARKS

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(MECH)

AL01: 597

AL02: 545


SRC: 34-165H820
(ARMOR)

AL01: 600

AL02: 548

NBC COMPANY

HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS

SRC: 03-387J100

AL01: 173

AL02: 151

TRAN: 116

SRC: 03-387A100

AL01: 173

AL02: 150

TRAN: 127

NBC COMPANY


CURRENT DIVISION

REMARKS

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AL01: 111


AL02: 102



HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

DIVISION BRIGADE

HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS

SRC: 87-042A110
(ARMOR)

AL01: 131

AL02: 116

TRAN: 120

SRC: 87-042A120
(MECH)

AL01: 132


AL02: 117

TRAN: 121

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

DIVISION BRIGADE

CURRENT DIVISION



REMARKS

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(ARMOR)

AL01: 119


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SRC: 37-042H000
(MECH)

AL01: 119

AL02: 107

TANK BATTALION **HEAVY DIVISION 86**




REMARKS

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EQ W/M60	
AL01: 592	
AL02: 554	
TRAN: 545	
SRC: 17-235J120	
EQ W/M1	
AL01: 603	
AL02: 564	
TRAN: 550	
A-SERIES	
M-60	M-1
AL01: 516	553
AL02: 503	538
TRAN: 486	519

TANK BATTALION

CURRENT DIVISION



REMARKS

SRC: 17-035H010


AL01: 537

AL02: 498

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY TANK BATTALION HEAVY DIVISION 86

REMARKS

SRC: 17-236J120
AL01: 355
AL02: 320
TRAN: 306
SRC: 17-236A120
AL01: 333
AL02: 318
TRAN: 307




REMARKS


SRC: 17-036H000

AL01: 186

AL02: 175



**TANK COMPANY
TANK BATTALION
HEAVY DIVISION 86**



REMARKS


SRC: 17-237J120
AL01: 62
AL02: 61
TRAN: 61

SRC: 17-237A120
AL01: 55
AL02: 55
TRAN: 53

TANK COMPANY **TANK BATTALION** **CURRENT DIVISION**

REMARKS

SRC: 17-037H010
 AL01: 90
 AL02: 81




COMBAT SUPPORT COMPANY **TANK BATTALION** **CURRENT DIVISION**

REMARKS

SRC: 17-039H000


AL01: 81

AL02: 80



INFANTRY BATTALION

HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS

SRC: 07-245J110
EQ W/FVS

AL01: 904

AL02: 853

TRAN: 818

SRC: 07-245J120
EQ W/M113

AL01: 951

AL02: 873

TRAN: 840

A-SERIES

FVS M113


AL01: 899 956

AL02: 849 841

TRAN: 825 841

INFANTRY BATTALION

CURRENT DIVISION



REMARKS

SRC: 07-045H010

AL01: 856

AL02: 783

REMARKS

SRC: 07-246J110
EQ W/FVS

AL01: 396

AL02: 364

TRAN: 325

SRC: 07-246J129
EQ W/M113

AL01: 351

AL02: 328

TRAN: 327


A-SERIES

FVS M113

ALQ1: 387 352

AL02: 356 328

TRAN: 324 328




HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

INFANTRY BATTALION


CURRENT DIVISION

REMARKS

SRC: 07-046H020
AL01: 211
AL02: 198



RILFE COMPANY INFANTRY BATTALION HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS

SRC: 07-247J110
EQ W/FVS

AL01: 110

AL02: 106

TRAN: 107

SRC: 07-247J120
EQ W/M113

AL01: 133

AL02: 120

TRAN: 112

A-SERIES

FVS M113

AL01: 111 134


AL02: 107 112

TRAN: 109 112


RIFLE COMPANY **INFANTRY BATTALION** **CURRENT DIVISION**

REMARKS

SRC: 07-047H020
 AL01: 156
 AL02: 143



ANTIARMOR COMPANY **INFANTRY BATTALION** **HEAVY DIVISION 86**



REMARKS

SRC: 07-248J100

AL01: 68

AL02: 65

TRAN: 65

A-SERIES

SAME AS ABOVE


COMBAT SUPPORT COMPANY **INFANTRY BATTALION** **CURRENT DIVISION**

REMARKS

SRC: 07-048H030

AL01: 136

AL02: 129




**ANTIARMOR COMPANY
INFANTRY BATTALION
CURRENT DIVISION**

REMARKS

NO COMPARABLE ORGANIZATION IN THE CURRENT DIVISIONS

DIVISION ARTILLERY

HEAVY DIVISION 86




REMARKS

DIVARTY STRENGTH
CAN BE DETERMINED
BY ADDING
APPLICABLE SRCs

DIVISION ARTILLERY

CURRENT DIVISION



REMARKS

SRC: 06-300H000
(ARMOR)

AL01: 2711

AL02: 2567

SRC: 06-300H020
(MECH)


AL01: 2703

AL02: 2559

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTERY

DIVISION ARTILLERY

HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS

SRC: 06-302A100
 AL01: 204
 AL02: 193
 TRAN: 191


HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTERY

DIVISION ARTILLERY

CURRENT DIVISION

REMARKS

SRC: 06-302H000
 AL01: 217
 AL02: 204



DIVISION TARGET ACQUISITION BATTALION


HEAVY DIVISION 86

REMARKS

SRC: 06-236S600

AL01: 385


NO A-SERIES TO
COMPARE




TARGET ACQUISITION BATTERY **DIVISION ARTILLERY** **CURRENT DIVISION**

REMARKS

SRC: 06-307H600
 AL01: 169
 AL02: 165



8 INCH/MLRS **FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION** **HEAVY DIVISION 86**



REMARKS

SRC: 06-395J110

AL01: 786

AL02: 740

TRAN: 687

SRC: 06-395A110

AL01: 781

AL02: 750

TRAN: 469

```
graph LR; Battery[Battery Symbol] --- HQ[HQ & HQ BTRY]; Battery --- FA[FA BTRY 8-INCH]; Battery --- SVC[SVC BTRY];
```

SRC:	06-395J130
AL01:	553
AL02:	514
TRAN:	510
SRC:	06-395A130
AL01:	540
AL02:	500
TRAN:	500


8 INCH, SELF-PROPELLED FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION CURRENT DIVISION

REMARKS


SRC: 06-395H020

AL01: 541

AL02: 495



155 MM, SELF-PROPELLED (3 X 6) **FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION** **HEAVY DIVISION 86**



REMARKS

SRC: 06-365J150
(ARMOR)

AL01: 747

AL02: 694

TRAN: 649

SRC: 06-365J170
(MECH)

AL01: 771

AL02: 718

TRAN: 673

A-SERIES


ARM MECH

AL01: 757 778

AL02: 684 708

TRAN: 647 673

155 MM, SELF-PROPELLED (3 X 8) **FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION** **HEAVY DIVISION 86**



REMARKS

SRC: 06-365J110
(ARMOR)

AL01: 822

AL02: 767

TRAN: 776

SRC: 06-365J130
(MECH)

AL01: 853

AL02: 802

TRAN: 804

A-SERIES

ARM MECH

AL01: 827 839

AL02: 763 774

TRAN: 653 664


**155 MM, SELF-PROPELLED
FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION
CURRENT DIVISION**

REMARKS

SRC: 06-365H000

AL01: 592

AL02: 565



AIR CAVALRY ATTACK BRIGADE

HEAVY DIVISION 86


REMARKS

SRC: (A-SERIES)

AL01: 1945

AL02: 1833

TRAN: 1834



AIR CAVALRY ATTACK BRIGADE


CURRENT DIVISION

REMARKS

SRC: 17-200H500

AL01: 3972

AL02: 3728



HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP AIR CAVALRY ATTACK BRIGADE HEAVY DIVISION 86


REMARKS

SRC: 17-202A100

AL01: 118


AL02: 109

TRAN: 106



COMBAT SUPPORT AVIATION BATTALION

HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS

SRC: 01-285A100

AL01: 654

AL02: 617

TRAN: 593

ATTACK HELICOPTER BATTALION

HEAVY DIVISION 86


REMARKS

SRC: 17-275A100

AL01: 270


AL02: 267

TRAN: 259



CAVALRY SQUADRON

HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS

SRC: 17-205A110

AL01: 631

AL02: 571

TRAN: 615

CAVALRY SQUADRON


CURRENT DIVISION

REMARKS

SRC: 17-105H020


AL01: 897

AL02: 835



COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION

CURRENT DIVISION



REMARKS


SRC: 17-085H700

AL01: 1151

AL02: 1083

DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND

HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS

SRC: A-SERIES

ARMOR

AL01: 3304

AL02: 3086

TRAN: 2975

MECH


AL01: 3291

AL02: 3073

TRAN: 2962

DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND

CURRENT DIVISION



REMARKS

SRC: 29-021H000
(ARMOR)

AL01: 2924

AL02: 2810

SRC: 29-011H000
(MECH)


AL01: 2840

AL02: 2722

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY SUPPORT COMMAND HEAVY DIVISION 86

REMARKS


SRC: 63- 002A100
AL01: 105
AL02: 100
TRAN: 100




HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY SUPPORT COMMAND CURRENT DIVISION

REMARKS

SRC: 29-002H700
AL01: 112
AL02: 102



HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS

SRC: 63-003J100

AL01: 170


AL02: 150

TRAN: 150

A-SERIES

SAME AS ABOVE

CURRENT DIVISION



REMARKS

SRC: 29-003H500

AL01: 137

AL02: 126

ADJUTANT GENERAL COMPANY

HEAVY DIVISION 86


REMARKS

SRC: 12-217A100

AL01: 259

AL02: 233

TRAN: 257



ADJUTANT GENERAL COMPANY


CURRENT DIVISION

REMARKS

SRC: 12-017H610


AL01: 286

AL02: 274



MAINTENANCE BATTALION

HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS


SRC: 43-005A100


AL01: 717

AL02: 666

TRAN: 645

AD-A128 777 PERSONNEL SUPPORTABILITY ASSESSMENT HEAVY DIVISION 86 3/3
TRANSITION VOLUME 1(U) ARMY SOLDIER SUPPORT
CENTER-NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION ALEXANDRIA VA 1981
UNCLASSIFIED SBI-AD-E758 436 F/G 5/9 NL






MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

MAINTENANCE BATTALION

HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS

SRC: 43-005A100


AL01: 717

AL02: 666

TRAN: 645

MAINTENANCE BATTALION

CURRENT DIVISION



REMARKS


SRC: 29-035H000

AL01: 1311

AL02: 1283

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION BATTALION

HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS

SRC: 42-005A100


AL01: 480

AL02: 448

TRAN: 364

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION BATTALION

CURRENT DIVISION



HQ & HQ CO

SUP & SVC CO

TRANS MTR
TRANS CO

REMARKS


SRC: 29-115H000

AL01: 469

AL02: 447

MEDICAL BATTALION

HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS

SRC: 08-205A100

AL01: 153

AL02: 144

TRAN: 133

MED CO

SRC: 08-207A100

1 BDE SPT BN


PER BDE

AL01: 78

AL02: 71

TRAN: 65

MEDICAL BATTALION
CURRENT DIVISION



HQ AND SPT CO

MED CO

REMARKS

SRC: 08-035H000

AL01: 396

AL02: 362

FINANCE COMPANY

HEAVY DIVISION 86

REMARKS

NO FINANCE COMPANY IN THE OBJECTIVE DIVISION.
FINANCE ORGANIZATIONS ARE CONSOLIDATED AT CORPS.

FINANCE COMPANY


CURRENT DIVISION

REMARKS

SRC: 14-037H610


AL01: 91

AL02: 87



BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION (1T X 2M)

HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS

SRC: 63-005J130

AL01: 410

AL02: 386

TRAN: 377

SRC: 63-005A130


AL01: 451

AL02: 426

TRAN: 420

BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION (2T X 1M)

HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS

SRC: 63-005J110

AL01: 464

AL02: 440

TRAN: 431

SRC: 63-005A110


AL01: 464

AL02: 439

TRAN: 433

BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION (2T X 2M)

HEAVY DIVISION 86



REMARKS

SRC: 63-005J120

AL01: 490

AL02: 466

TRAN: 457

SRC: 63-005A120

AL01: 490

AL02: 465

TRAN: 459

BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION

CURRENT DIVISION

REMARKS

NO COMPARABLE ORGANIZATION IN THE CURRENT DIVISIONS

SYSTEM RELATIONSHIPS


CONTEXT

The impact of a major change in any Army subsystem will have an impact on soldiers. There are a number of evolving systems, policies, programs, concepts and studies that have a potential impact on the manpower, personnel and training supportability of Heavy Division 86. These include changes in the following areas:

- Planning Framework
- Related Structure
- New Manning System
- Personnel Policies and Programs
- Training System
- Doctrinal Developments
- Materiel Acquisition System

The purpose of this section is to identify and outline relevant impacts on the transition to Heavy Division 86 as shown below:

SYSTEM RELATIONSHIPS



PLANNING FRAMEWORK

The planning process provides a resourcing framework to meet doctrine generated requirements. Among the planning issues affecting Heavy Division 86, the following have an identified potential impact:


- TAADS documentation
- Projective planning systems
- Force mix changes
- Restationing plans
- Total Army Analysis
- Mission Area Analysis
- Mobilization Plans
- Army 90's Transition
- Functional Area Studies

TAADS DOCUMENTATION


Army programing and budgeting guidance drives changes to MTOE and TDA units through the Force Accounting System (FAS) and the Army Authorization Document System (TAADS). These changes result in semi-annual authorizations changes to unit structure which in turn drive personnel and training resourcing documents which provide approximately 18 months leadtime to the personnel and training community for new equipment driven changes in personnel requirements as shown in the following pages.


The leadtime required to field a properly trained soldier is from 27 to 40 months between identification of the requirement and soldier availability in the unit. This is illustrated below:

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS



These changes, and changes to personnel requirements driven by structure adjustments or new capabilities must be identified in unit TAADS documents early enough to resource accession, training, utilization, and retention of the right soldier in the right place at the right time. Due to the structure of the Planning, Programing and Budgeting System (PPBS), documented manning requirements and authorizations are generated through a time driven, cyclic process. This does not allow for identification of event driven changing requirements early enough to ensure adequate leadtime to meet personnel and training resourcing needs.






A need exists, therefore, to accurately project estimated personnel requirements and authorizations further into the future based on known and anticipated equipment and force structure changes. These include new systems and revised unit TOE, MTOE and TDA and unit transactions. This data must be linked to new equipment fielding documentation and transition guidance a minimum of six years in advance to accommodate resourcing of facilities and as much as three and one half years in advance to provide trained soldiers to their units on time. Only by development of a Total Army projective personnel data base can this be accomplished in a manner that will provide decision makers with alternatives that allow for manpower, personnel and training affordable and supportable choices. This is shown below:

The diagram shows a 3D grid with the following labels:

- Vertical Axis (Top):** OTHER FORCES, EAC, CC DB, CORPS DB, INF BDE DB, INF DIV DB, TDA
- Horizontal Axis (Left):** IN, AR, FA, AD, AV, IT, SI, EN, C², CM, AG, FI, MD, MP, OD, QM, TC, LG
- Depth Axis (Right):** IRR / OTHER, USAR / ARNG, ACTIVE, ARMY

The methodology described in VOL I, Annex A (METHODOLOGY) allows for projections of MOS and grade revisions within functional areas and iterative force structures such as that contained in this assessment for Heavy Division 86. These projections can influence the current documents upon which personnel and training resource managers rely as shown below:



FORCE MIX

As the composition of the total force evolves over time with a changing end strength requirement, mix of types of divisions, combat to support balance and active to reserve component ratios, projective personnel planning must also account for the interface of these future changes in terms of grade, skill and training resource requirements.

**TOTAL ARMY
ANALYSIS**

The Total Army Analysis supports the development of the Heavy Division 86 transition program. Through quantitative analysis, combat organization designs are played, war fighting simulations are conducted and support structures are developed. Casualty flows are determined to provide replacement data. Affordability analysis provides a qualitative dimension and results feed the modernization of force structure programs. An Army 86 excursion was run subsequently to TAA 87 which included the Y-Series Heavy Divisions. The J-Series Heavy Divisions are scheduled to be part of the TAA 88 Force. The personnel supportability assessment has the potential to contribute detailed data to the TAA process for improved casualty stratification modeling and replacement data.

**RESTATIONING
PLANS**

Changes in unit facilities and training areas required to support the Heavy Divisions must be identified, approved and budgeted early to accommodate varying unit size, new equipment, maintenance and repair requirements and training needs. As stated earlier, a minimum of six years are required for MCA program funding from resource requirements identification to completed construction. This is particularly important in light of the USAREUR Restationing Plan and Program Decision Guidance affecting the Heavy Division Force Structure. As the Heavy Corps 86 and Echelons Above Corps 86 structures take shape, they will also require advanced programing of fixed facilities to ensure adequate support of the divisions and support functions.

**MOBILIZATION
AND DEPLOY-
MENT PLANS**

Wartime requirements over time must address Heavy Division 86 augmentation, reinforcement and sustainment, much of which will require mobilization of units and personnel from Reserve Component..

Prepositioned and sustainment stocks, strategic lift and personnel replacements must be programed to support the evolving Heavy Division 86 structures with the right kinds and quantities of supplies, fuels, ammunition and repair parts and the right skills and grades for replacements and augmentees.

Reserve component units that support active Army units in war must have the right kinds of communications equipment, maintenance and repair capabilities and tactical mobility to ensure adequate back-up. Reserve component combat and combat support forces must be upgraded to ensure fighting capability compatible with their active Army counterparts. IRR individual and RC package replacements must have skills and grades matched to evolving Heavy Division 86 requirements as closely as possible.

MISSION AREA ANALYSIS

The Mission Area Analysis process identified future organizational, doctrinal, equipment, personnel training and logistical support mission element needs to meet a changing threat. The TRADOC MAA Level II studies match the Heavy Division 86 structured force against a future threat in both NATO theatre and contingency scenarios. Projective personnel data in each TRADOC mission area assist the analysis process. The Heavy Division 86 Personnel Supportability Assessment has been tailored, in part, for MAA study utility. This will assist in identifying manpower, personnel and training deficiencies for resolution through definition of mission element needs in these areas.

DEMOGRAPHICS

Personnel and training support for the Heavy Division 86 force must account for demographic trends toward a smaller base of entry level 17 to 21 year old males and declining standard score performance on many of the ASVAB test areas until FY81. FY82 preliminary data also supports a reversal of this negative trend. Future, accession, training and retention policies and programs to support the evolving force structure must address both positive and negative demographic trends early enough to ensure continued supportability of the force in light of total Army force structure evolution. Selected data on ASVAB test area performance and trends are captured in VOL I, Annex B (MOS MATRIX) and VOL III.

ARMY 90's TRANSITION

Decision guidance is provided for the transition to Heavy Division 86 force structure by the Army 90's Transition Plan. This document provides interim and final conversion timeframes, authorized levels of organization (ALO), projected

activations, inactivations and other unit transactions, equipment pacing guidance for unit structure conversions and other program planning data. Guidance for Heavy Division 86 Transition contained in this document was influenced by personnel supportability factors surfaced in the March 1981 Heavy Division 86 Personnel Supportability Assessment.

FUNCTIONAL AREA STUDIES & ANALYSES

A number of functional area studies and analyses have a potential impact on manpower, personnel and training requirements to support the evolving Heavy Division 86 force. These include the following:



INFANTRY	-Close Combat (Heavy) MAA Level II
ARMOR	-Infantry/Armor Functional Review
FIELD	-Infantry/Armor Functional Review
ARTILLERY	-Fire Support MAA Level II
	-Field Artillery Functional Review
	-Close Support Study Group II
AIR DEFENSE	-Air Defense MAA Level II
	-Air Defense Functional Review
	-Air Defense Program 92
INTEL/EW	-Intelligence/EW MAA Level II
	-Intelligence/EW Functional Review
	-Accelerated Acquisition Study
MOBILITY/ COUNTER-	-Mobility, Countermobility and Mine Warfare MAA Level II
MOBILITY & MINE	-Revision of Officer Specialty 21
WARFARE	-Engineer Functional Area Update
COMMUNI-	-Communications MAA Level II
CATIONS	-Signal Functional Review
	-COMSEC Logistics Study
	-CMF 29 Study
	-Calibration Coordination Study
COMMAND & CONTROL	-Command and Control MAA Level II
	-Signal Functional Review
AVIATION	-Aviation MAA Level II
	-Aviation Functional Review
	-Aviation Requirements for Combat Structure - Army III & IV.
	-CMF 67 Study
	-Aviation RETO Study
	-Aircrew Ratio Study
	-SC 15 Methodology Study
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	-Combat Service Support MAA Level II
	-Logistics Functional Review
	-Cook Reduction Study
	-Study of Army Logistics-81
	-Casualty Estimation Study
	-Combat Field Feeding System
	-Near Term Water Support
	-Automated Wartime Functional Supply requirements (AWFSR)
BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WARFARE	-Battlefield Nuclear Warfare MAA Level I
CHEMICAL	-CMF 54 Revision
	-CS NBC (Defensive) MAA Levels I & II

RELATED STRUCTURE

The heavy divisions do not exist in a vacuum on the battlefield. Related divisional and non-divisional forces, both Active Army and Reserve Components, accomplish other missions, support the heavy divisions and augment, sustain and reconstitute them.

HEAVY CORPS 86

The Heavy Corps 86 structure is a flexible grouping of functional and command and control elements designed to expand over time in war. Its primary missions are to attack deep; neutralize enemy action in the corps rear area; control, support, sustain and reconstitute the attached heavy divisions and other combat forces and to provide services not available in the divisions. Personnel resources required for Heavy Corps 86 force structures will, in many cases, compete with the Heavy divisions to fill required divisional units. The Heavy Corps 86 structures are shown below:




The personnel supportability of the Heavy Corps can be assessed upon publication of unit structure detail and approved transition guidance. This assessment will also involve Reserve Component forces.


ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS

Echelons Above Corps 86 force structure is also a flexible grouping of functional and command and control elements designed to expand over time in war. Their primary missions are to provide a Theatre Army support structure for attached US and allied combat forces, provide command and control interface with the national command authority, integrate joint service functions and operations, coordinate host nation support and conduct special operations. The EAC 86 structure relies heavily on both Reserve Component forces and host nation support forces and assets. Personnel resources required for EAC 86 force structures will also compete with the heavy divisions for constrained personnel resources. The EAC 86 structures are shown below:

THEATER ARMY ORGANIZATION (INITIAL)



THEATER ARMY ORGANIZATION (MATURE)



The personnel supportability of the EAC 86 structures can be assessed upon publication of unit structure detail and approved transition guidance. As with the Heavy Corps, this will involve Reserve Component forces.

OTHER FORCES

Additional Army 90's transition changes include Infantry Division 86 and Contingency Corps 36. These coupled with other Army MTOE and TDA force structure changes, will also compete with the heavy divisions for scarce personnel resources. Force modernization initiatives and programs such as the High Technology Light Division, Restructured Airborne and Airmobile Divisions and establishment of Rear Area Combat Brigades may require tradeoffs with the Army 90's program force structure of manning levels. The potential impact of this problem is particularly critical in the training base and in the initial active Army authorizations to accommodate mobilization surge. Additionally, the integration of Reserve Components units and individual replacements upon mobilization must be accessed for personnel supportability of the total force.

NEW MANNING SYSTEM CHANGES

Two major changes in the Army personnel system will impact on the supportability of the Heavy Division 86 force. These are the New Manning System and Proponency for integrated personnel and training management. Overall the impacts of these systems are expected to ease turbulence and instability associated with Heavy Division 86 Transition.

THE NEW MANNING SYSTEM

Army cohesion and stability initiatives resulted in development of a new manning system that would modify our current individual replacement and overseas rotation system to incorporate potential unit replacement and rotation programs. The new manning system will incorporate the American Regimental System. It will also integrate personnel policies and regulations to accomplish cohesion driven actions, and identify personnel systems disconnects both within the personnel community and in relation to other functional proponents.

PROJECT COHORT/ COMPANY REPLACEMENT

In FY81, 20 company size units began formation and initial entry training, with unit identity maintained upon integration with parent units. The initial success of these units has led to a planned expansion and field evaluation to include unit movement.

COMPANY ROTATION

Beginning in FY82, accessions will fill six company size units for late FY83 OCONUS rotation. This project may become an alternative to, or compatible with, company replacement.

BATTALION ROTATION	Beginning in FY84, six prototype battalion rotations will be implemented. The relationship of this initiative to increasing turbulence due to single E-Date Heavy Division 86 unit conversions to A-Series organizations, and to equipment modernization, is being closely coordinated and monitored by responsible agencies of the DCSPER and TRADOC
AMERICAN REGIMENTAL SYSTEM	The American Regimental System is designed to incorporate a cohesion building pattern of unit and non-unit assignments for soldiers within a parent unit identity. Initially, battalions will be paired for CONUS/OCNUS alignment to regiments. Regimental designations will then be identified with groups of battalion pairs in mid-FY82. Identification of individual soldiers with regiments will be in late FY82 under a Regimental Affiliation Program. Recurring unit assignment to Regimental battalions will then be managed under revised personnel policies.
EVALUATION PROGRAM	Evaluation will include a field evaluation of the best alternative(s) for unit movement, modeling of grade progression in a Regimental system and other studies.
POLICY & REGULATION INTEGRATION/ IDENTIFICATION OF DISCONNECTS	Personnel policies and regulations are being reviewed to revise those that do not support new manning system programs. Additionally, disconnects between personnel policies and regulations and related guidance are being identified for resolution under the new manning system.
RETENTION	Retention concepts are being investigated to ensure continued availability of high quality and high skill soldiers. Quality Bonuses are being considered for key junior enlisted personnel eligible for separation. Revised Selective Reenlistment Bonuses are also being considered. Bonuses are being investigated for voluntary reclassification and training in shortage skills.
FEMALE SOLDIERS	The Women in the Army (WITA) Study is conducting an investigation of the appropriate role of female soldiers in proximity to combat areas. Care must be taken to ensure that any change in male/female ratio does not limit required support of doctrinal changes associated with Heavy Division 86 transition or create a space imbalance condition for forward deployed males.

COMBAT ARMS DETAIL

Detailing of male RA Combat Service Support 2d Lieutenants to combat arms and combat support arms units is being reinvestigated. Such a Combat Arms Detail could resolve the current shortfall in CSS accessions while providing early troop leadership experience for which opportunities are currently limited. Combat Arms detailing of female CSS officers is being investigated by the WITA Study Group. Detailing of MI officers is also under consideration. Considerable relief for five of the six Heavy Division 86 problem SSI (35A, 91A, 91B, 92A and 92B) may be generated by this proposal if adopted in FY82 since most of these SSI requirements increases occur in FY84. Relief in FY83 and FY84 for major requirements increases in the sixth problem SSI (13E) could also be generated by this proposal. Recoding of selected current combat arms positions to CSS such as Battalion Ammunition Officer in Field Artillery units, could also provide relief for near term increases.

PROPONENCY

The transfer of proponency for most Army Career Management Fields and Officer Specialties from DA Staff agencies to TRADOC School commandants on 1 October 1981 provides a powerful potential for better integration of personnel and training issues affecting Heavy Division 86 transition. Proponents will now advise the DCSPER and MILPERCEN in formulating personnel policies and programs. TRADOC will also integrate proponency related actions. A revision to AR 600-101 will contain new Specialty Proponency guidance as illustrated below:

Proponent	Commissioned Specialty	Warrant MOS	Entered CDP	Proponent	Commissioned Specialty	Warrant MOS	Entered CDP
Infantry School	11	—	11	Soldier Rpt Center	40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45	021AQ, 031AQ, 711AQ, 711AM, 741AQ, 741AW, 741AR	71, 74, 75, 97
Armor School	12	108AH, BH, CH, OH, EH, OH, RH, 201AQ, 211AC, 214EO, 214QO	12	Comptroller of the Army	46	—	—
Field Artillery School	13	2218Q, 2228Q, 222CO, 223AC, 2248Q	13, 23, 27	OCOS for Operations	46, 52	—	84
Air Defense School	14	108AQ, 108BP, 100AA, BA, CA, DA, EA, VA, RA, 100AC, BC, CC, DC, EC, OD, RC, 100AF, BF, CF, DF, EF, OF, 100CO, 100DO, 100EO, 100FO, 100GO, 100HO	—	Material Readiness and Development Command	51, 97	—	—
Aviation School	15	—	—	Judge Advocate General	55	713AQ	—
Engineer School	21	310AQ, 310AS, 621AQ, 621AV, 611AQ, 621AQ, 633AQ, 641AQ	12, 51, 61	Chief of Chastaine	56	—	—
Signal School	25, 27, 72	252AQ, 288AQ, 287AQ, 287AY, 290AC, 290AL, 290AV, 290AW, 290AY	28, 29, 31	Surgeon General	60-66	011AQ, 051AQ, 108AQ, BD, CO, DO, EB, OD, PD, 202AQ	91
Combined Arms Center	29, 46, 54	—	—	OCOS for Logistics	70	—	—
Intelligence School	30, 35, 36, 37	100BN, 785AQ, 961AQ, 972AQ, 964AQ, 971AQ, 971AN, 972AQ, 972AN, 973AQ, 982AQ, 983AQ, 984AQ, 985AQ, 986AQ, 988AQ	33, 36, 38	Transportation School	71, 96	100AE, BE, CE, DE, EE, OE, RE, 160AE, 100AQ, BG, CG, DG, EG, OG, PG, 100AJ, BJ, CJ, DJ, EJ, GJ, HJ, 90AQ, 903AQ, 906AQ, 92, 93, 903AA, 510AQ, 510AT, 510A2, 510A3, 510A4, 214EV, 222BV, 223BN, 224BV, 280AQ, 271AQ, 411AQ, 421AQ, 441AQ, 530AC, 630AV	64, 97
Military Police School	31	951AQ, 951AN, 951AL, 951AM, 951AN, 951AP, 951AR, 951AS, 971AR, 971AP, 972AR	39	Ordnance School	73, 75, 81	214EV, 222BV, 223BN, 224BV, 280AQ, 271AQ, 411AQ, 421AQ, 441AQ, 530AC, 630AV	56, 63
				Chemical School	74	—	54
				Quartermaster School	81, 82, 92	041AQ, 401AQ, 781AQ, 782AC	78, 92
				OCOS for Personnel	—	100AB, BB, CB, DB, EB, OB, RB	94

PERSONNEL POLICY CHANGES	A number of personnel policy and program concepts are being investigated to provide alternatives for solutions of current problem areas. These concepts must evolve in consideration of Heavy Division 86 personnel supportability.
SKILL PROGRESSION	Competency-based Skill Progression is being investigated to ensure a closer relationship between demonstrated skills and promotion and to provide a framework for Mastery Training approaches.
RETENTION	Retention concepts are being investigated to ensure continued availability of high quality and high skill soldiers. Under this concept, Quality Bonuses are being investigated for key junior enlisted personnel eligible for separation. Revised Selective Reenlistment Bonuses are also being considered. Bonuses are being investigated for voluntary reclassification and training in shortage skills.
LATERAL PLACEMENT	Lateral placement of technically qualified personnel in critical technical skills is being considered for expansion under the Army Civilian Acquired Skills Program. This may provide near term solution to increasing technical skill requirements and training base expansion constraints. Measures must still be devised to ensure that the "soldiering" aspects of training adequately accommodate laterally placed accessions.
FEMALE SOLDIERS	Investigation of the appropriate role of female soldiers in combat areas is nearing completion. Care must be taken to ensure that any change in male/female ratio does not limit required support of doctrinal changes associated with Heavy Division 86 transition or create a space imbalance condition for forward deployed males.
RESERVE COMPONENTS	Reserve component changes being investigated include expansion of the training base to accommodate seasonal peaks, structure changes to match RC to AC structures, increased emphasis on quality accessions and RC obligated service extensions. Affiliation bonuses and in-service USAR/ARNG recruiting are also being investigated. Additionally, ways to avoid cross leveling units upon mobilization to fill early-deploying Active and RC unit requirements are being investigated to preserve unit cohesion. Aspects of the Regimental System, already exist in the Army National Guard. Follow-up

Active and Reserve Component actions to implement the Regimental System, particularly as it affects the National Guard round out brigades of the Heavy Divisions, should ensure closer alignment of varying component personnel policies and capitalization on existing RC experience.

TRAINING CHANGES

A number of major training changes potentially affect the transition to Heavy Division 86. These include enlisted and officer initial and professional development training changes, changing training requirements for new materiel systems, package training of units and crews and a renewed emphasis on the "'will'" component of the "'skill+will=Kill'" equation.

RETO

The Review of Education and Training - Officer generated numerous changes to officer development patterns. Several of these; the expansion of basic courses, elimination of, or changes to, advanced courses, and changes to command and staff courses are expected to better prepare the officer corps for the specialty requirements associated with force modernization.

MASTERY TRAINING

Training programs to produce technical excellence are being introduced for non-commissioned officers. Initial success in the Master Mechanic and Master Gunner programs should expand this effort. Initiatives are being investigated to expand this program to a competence based, potential oriented training approach. This would key requirements and resourcing decisions to demonstrated competence at Basic Intermediate, Advanced, Master and Leader levels rather than grade/skill levels under current practice.

SYSTEM SPECIFIC SKILLS

Realignment of CMF 27, 63, 67 and 74 to support specific equipment systems maintenance and repair and CMF 11, 13, 16, 19 and 98 to support specific system operational requirements emphasizes the move toward specialization in the enlisted force. This is particularly evident in the skills required to support Heavy Division 86. Training time, facilities, programs and personnel support are all being impacted by these changes. Increasing specialization requirements may, over time, decrease the flexibility of units with personnel shortages, and of soldiers to quickly adapt to changing circumstances. This must be accounted for in institutional and unit training and cross-training programs.

PACKAGE
TRAINING

Training of crews, teams or entire company size units as "packages" is increasing. This derives from both new equipment/system requirements and from cohesion initiatives such as COHORT discussed earlier. The Air Defense community is particularly dependent on package training. This causes a "double dip" on personnel inventories in order to maintain required operational readiness while preparing replacement units trained on new systems such as DIVAD. Other package trained units, such as MLRS batteries, do not "double dip" on personnel requirements since they represent a new capability.

"SOLDIER"
TRAINING

New training initiatives to improve the "'will'" of soldiers are being investigated by the Components Group, 9th Infantry Division and the High Technology Test Bed, with TRADOC and Army Research community support. This has potential benefits for developing competent courageous, committed soldiers, with high integrity, in cohesive Heavy Division 86 units as well. A force multiplying and conserving effect can be generated from this innovative effort which should increase the effectiveness of the Heavy Division 86 force at relatively low cost.

DOCTRINE
CHANGES

While doctrinally, or "concept" based, the Heavy Division 86 structure, in part, remains equipment driven. New doctrine, associated with changing threats and exploitation of materiel and human technologies, is emerging which has implications for the future evolution of the Heavy Divisions.

AIR-LAND
BATTLE 2000

Concepts for fighting the Air-Land Battle of the future increasingly emphasize the extended and integrated battlefield. This has placed emphasis on mobility; command, control, communications and Intelligence (C3I); interdiction, nuclear and chemical operations; and rear area protection. These needs are generating new requirements, many at corps level, which may compete with the divisions for personnel resources. Additionally, the concept based acquisition system will ensure that how we plan to fight drives the equipment and weapons the Army acquires, rather than the other way around.

RAPID
DEPLOYMENT &
CONTINGENCY
MISSIONS

New threats have generated requirements for an increased capability to deploy rapidly to contingency areas. This may impact several of the Heavy Divisions. As light, mobile forces increase, potential exists for erosion of Heavy Division unit assets and personnel resourcing unless accompanied by end strength increases. Contingency Corps 86 and the High Technology Division, will be analyzed for personnel supportability in light of requirements to support transition to Heavy Division 86 and Heavy Corps 86.

FM 100-5

The new FM 100-5: Operations places increased emphasis on the intangibles of war. This forces a new look at the quality of personnel and training, both from a systems perspective and from the actual potential and performance of our soldiers. Preservation and enhancement of leadership, innovation, flexibility and other traditional advantages of American soldiers over their enemies requires a quality base. Personnel and training policies have oriented in this direction.

RECONSTITUTION

Reconstitution of the force to regenerate fighting capacity requires functional coordination and support. While a major portion of the reconstitution effort is borne by corps and EAC elements, weapon system replacement operations and direction of damage assessment, individual and unit replacements and support requirements to priority areas will have an impact on Heavy Division 86 personnel resources. This may necessitate a shift to a "supply-push" system to supplement the current "demand-pull" personnel requisition process. It will certainly require total systems coordination between operations, personnel, supply, maintenance and information managers and with unit leaders in combat.

WARTIME SYSTEMS

The transition from peace to war is well programed in the Heavy Division 86 structure. Numerous related wartime implications, however, remain to be addressed. Significant among these are augmentation requirements, "space-face" match in peacetime, alignment of echelons above division for wartime support of the Heavy Divisions and the impact of package training and unit rotation/replacement on wartime casualty replacement, unit reconstitution and sustainment.

C3I

Increases in C3I capability are generating increasing requirements for highly skilled battlefield automation, communications and intelligence operators, equipment maintainers and repairers and information systems managers. Leadership implications include computer dependency, information overload, signature and NBC effects vulnerability, and centralized command and control of operations. The implications of C3I systems on the types and qualities of personnel required to man the Heavy Divisions must be closely monitored to ensure that we get the payoff we seek in combat advantage. Innovations such as the Cellular Command Post may assist in this effort, but may also have a personnel cost if adopted.

MATERIEL
CHANGES

Numerous materiel development and acquisition initiatives are being conducted without documented personnel impact. These ongoing materiel developments and acquisition actions may affect the evolving Heavy Division 86 force. Such actions include shifting emphasis toward lighter, more deployable weapons and support systems; efforts to streamline the materiel development and acquisition process; and potential impacts of new systems with an as yet unknown personnel impact. They also may affect skill requirements changes due to battlefield automation and shifting functional emphasis towards increasing Aviation and Intelligence force structure in the heavy divisions with attendant 'shakedown' changes to be anticipated.

DEPLOYMENT
CRITERIA

The need for improved strategic flexibility is requiring increased emphasis on rapid deployability of units from CONUS and intertheatre. Depending on the threat, this may require rapid movement of heavy, as well as light forces. New materiel development programs are highlighting the need for lighter, smaller systems to meet deployment criteria. More, bigger and better strategic and tactical air and sea lift systems are also being developed to get current and programmed equipment where it is needed, in a hurry. Related issues, such as rail capacity, tank transporters, cargo cranes, containerization and roll-on/roll-off capability are also being addressed. Implications for the personnel supportability of evolving heavy divisions include the potential for increased combat service support personnel requirements in the mid-term, with a reduction of those requirements as lighter smaller replacement systems are introduced in the 1990's. Additionally, in the long term, fewer heavy divisions may be required as capability and lethality continue to increase.

STREAMLINED
MATERIEL
ACQUISITION
PROCESS

Efforts to reduce the traditional "13 year" concept-to-capability cycle in the materiel development and acquisition process may further accelerate the pace of change in personnel and skill training requirements. "Off the shelf" procurement of commercial or foreign produced 'state of the art' high technology items is already being investigated in the battlefield automation and intelligence areas. This concept is being tested by the High Technology Test Bed for applications in tactical mobility, protection, soldier needs and other functional areas. Closer working relationships between the materiel developments and personnel and training communities are underway in the MAA and Life Cycle Systems management processes. This should preclude unsupportable personnel and training impacts of changes in the materiel acquisition process.

NEW SYSTEMS A number of new materiel systems have been identified for support of Heavy Division 36 functional requirements which have yet to be fully documented for personnel and training impact. These systems include:

SLUFAE -The Surfaced Launched Unit Fuel-Air Explosive (SLUFAE), will provide a mine field breaching capability. It will be organic to the Engineer Battalion. Fielding is due to begin in the late 1980's. Estimated personnel requirements are unknown but expected to be minimal due to space tradeoffs.

SOTAS -The Standoff Target Acquisition System (SOTAS) will provide real-time moving target indicator display. It will be organic to the CEWI Battalion and Aviation Combat Support Battalion. Fielding is due to begin in FY 87 prior to system deletion from the program. If restored, estimated personnel requirement could increase by 77 personnel per heavy division. MOS decision and detailed personnel and training impact would then be required prior to FY 85.

TEAMPACK -AN/MSQ-103 (TEAMPACK) will provide a divisional direction finding capability to locate non-communications emitters. It will be organic to the CEWI Battalion and will replace the AN/MLQ-24 beginning in FY83. Estimated personnel requirements will increase by three personnel per heavy division. Detailed personnel and training resources must be programed now.

TACJAM -AN/MLQ-34 (TACJAM) will provide multi-mode tactical jamming of enemy emitters. It will be organic to the CEWI Battalion and will replace AN/GLQ-3B beginning in FY83. Estimated personnel requirements involve DS/GS maintenance support. Again, detailed personnel and training resource programing is needed as soon as possible.

TCAC-D/
ASAS -Technical Control and Analysis Center-Division (TCAC-D). Provides interim capability for all source analysis pending availability of All Source Analysis System (ASAS). It will be organic to the CEWI Battalion and will have limited fielding beginning in FY 83. Estimated personnel requirements to support the system is 30 personnel in each of the five heavy divisions (4 OCONUS/1 CONUS) for which programmed. ASAS will begin to replace TCAC-D in FY 87. Personnel requirements are expected to be met using organic CEWI Battalion assets currently dedicated to TCAC-D, the DTOC support element and Technical Control and Analysis element.

TRAILBLAZER -AN/TSQ-114A (TRAILBLAZER) will provide direction finding and intercept capability. It will be organic to the CEWI Battalion and will replace the AN/TRQ-32 beginning in FY84. Estimated personnel requirements will increase by 16 personnel per heavy division. Personnel and training requirements identification is needed early on.

QUICKFIX -AN/ALQ-151 (QUICKFIX IIB) will provide an airborne communications, direction finding, intercept and jamming capability. It will be organic to the CEWI Battalion and the Combat Support Aviation Battalion. It will replace QUICKFIX IA and IB beginning in FY86. Estimated personnel requirements increase by 22 personnel per heavy division for all but one division currently equipped with QUICKFIX IA. Detailed personnel and training requirements for interim QUICKFIX I systems must be programed now, and for QUICKFIX II in FY 83 for the FY 85-89 POM.

TRAFFICJAM -AN/TLQ-17A (TRAFFICJAM) will provide a communications intercept and jamming capability. It will be organic to the CEWI Battalion and will replace the AN/TLQ-17 beginning in FY82. Estimated personnel impacts are expected to involve training without significant personnel increase.

REMBASS -The Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS) will provide a seismic, acoustic, magnetic and infrared target detection and early warning system. It will be organic to the CEWI Battalion. Fielding is due to begin in FY84. Estimated personnel requirements will increase by 15 personnel per heavy division. Personnel and training resources must be programed not later than the FY84-88 POM.

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